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The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer)
Continuing his study of the law of products liability, the
author details the recent explosion in the field.
William L. Prosser*
The fall of a citadel is a dramatic moment. The stronghold has
long been invested; the siege has endured for months. Parallels
have been dug and gun emplacements mounted; and a grim can-
nonade has made breaches in the great wall, behind which the
defenders have erected demilunes, so that the struggle goes on.
There is a final heavy bombardment; the assault goes forward
against the main breach, and the storming party ascends over
the corpses of the slain. There is a desperate hour of hand-to-hand
combat, and then the moment when the defense falters. The line
wavers; the break becomes a retreat, the retreat a rout. The rest
is the story of sack and slaughter, of riot, rape and rapine, that
has added an evil luster to the names of Magdeburg and Badajoz,
along with ancient Troy.
In the field of products liability, the date of the fall of the cita-
del of privity can be fixed with some certainty. It was May 9,
1960, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced the de-
cision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. The leaguer
had been an epic one of more than fifty years. The sister fortress
of negligence liability had fallen, after an equally prolonged de-
fense, in 1916 Much sapping and mining had finally carried a
whole south wing of the strict liability citadel, involving food
and drink; and further inroads had been made into an adjoining
area of products for what might be called intimate bodily use,
such as hair dye and cosmetics Heavy artillery had made no less
*Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law.
1. 82 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
2. See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE LJ.
1099 (1960).
3. E.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1965)
(hair dye); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d
612 (1958) (permanent wave -solution).
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than eight major breaches in the main wall, all of them still
stoutly defended.4
Then came the Henningsen case. Chrysler made an automobile
and sold it to the dealer Bloomfield. Bloomfield resold it to Hen-
4.
Of all the decisions against manufacturers which attack privity and
appear to take the step from food to mechanical products, none has
the untainted basis of Henningsen. The most frequently cited precursor
of Henningsen, Di Vello v. Gardner Machine Co., [46 Ohio Op. 161,
102 N.E.2d 289 (C.P. 1951)] ... may well have been overruled. [Wood
v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 278, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953)].
Spence v. Three Rivers Buildere & Masonry Supply [353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958)] held a manufacturer of defective cinder blocks
strictly liable to their ultimate user, but conveniently found that the
proofs also showed the manufacturer to have been negligent. In Con-
tinental Copper & Steel Indus. v. "Red" Cornelius [104 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
App. 1958)], B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond [269 F.2d 501 (10th
Cir. 1959)] and Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., [191 Pa. Super. 422, 156
A.2d 568 (1959)], the plaintiffs, respective purchasers of electric cable,
tires and an automobile, all recovered against the distant manufacturer
on a warranty theory, but though no privity was present, they, unlike
Mrs. Henningsen, stood firmly within the chain of title. The salutary
result in the Jarnot case was probably an accident, the court having
patently misconstrued the cases on which it relied. Beck v. Spindler
[256 M nn. 543, 99 N.WN2d 670 (1959)] permitted the purchaser of a
poorly constructed house trailer to recover against the manufacturer
but, in an unusual set of facts, seemed to regard the manufacturer
a party to the sale and further found that an express, as well as an
implied, warranty had been breached. The pre-Henningsen picture is
completed with the strange turn of events in Peterson v. Lamb Rubber
Co. [54 Cal. 2d 889, 858 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960)] and Hinton
v. Republic Aviation Corp. [180 F. Supp. 31 (SI).N.Y. 1959)]. The
former case, at the intermediate appellate level [343 P.2d 261 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959)], discarded the privity requirement as against the
manufacturer of a defective grinding wheel. However, the decision was
promptly vacated by the California Supreme Court, the case to be
heard by them de novo. Under somewhat unusual California procedure,
the vacated opinion of the District Court of Appeals becomes as if
never written, is not officially reported and may not -thereafter be re-
ferred to without a material breach of California legal etiquette. These
proscriptions surrounding the vacated opinion, however, did not deter
a United States District Court in the Hinton case, some months later,
from allowing recovery in warranty without privity from an aircraft
manufacturer. The Southern District of New York, applying California
law, relied on the vacated Peterson decision. Suffice it to say that, sub-
sequent to Hinton, the California Supreme Court in Peterson found
privity to exist on its facts and apparently restored the privity require-
ment to California law in cases involving mechanical products.
Milling, Henningsen and the Pre-Delivery Inspection and Conditioning
Schedule, 16 RuTGas L. Rav. 559-60 (1962).
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ningsen. While Henningsen's wife was driving it, "something went
wrong" with the steering gear, and the car turned sharply to
the right into a wall. Mrs. Henningsen was injured and brought
action against both Chrysler and Bloomfield. In a long and
thorough opinion, much the best theretofore written on the sub-
ject, the court held both defendants liable, without any showing
of negligence and without privity of contract. The decision was
buttressed with a good many words about modern mass market-
ing and demands created through advertising media, and the
necessity of protecting the consumer by a rule that
the burden of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is borne
by those who are in a position to either control the danger or make an
equitable distribution of the losses when they do occur... 5 According-
ly, we hold that under modern marketing conditions, when a manufac-
turer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its
purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suit-
able for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate pui-
chaser. Absence of agency between the manufacturer and the dealer
who makes the ultimate sale is immateria 6
The citadel fell. The method of storming it was not unlike that
of Cardozo in MacPherson 'v. Buick Motor Co.! long since, where
the negligence exception as to "inherently" or "imminently"
dangerous products was expanded to swallow up the rules as to
all products. Now the special rule as to food and drink was ex-
panded to engulf the rest.
We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly
in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome
beverage may bring illness to one person, the defective car, with its
great potentiality for harm to the driver, occupants, and others, de-
mands even less adherence to the narrow barrier of privity.8
What has followed has been the most rapid9 and altogether
5. 32 N.J. at 379, 161 A.2d at 81.
6. Id. at 384, 161 A.Rd at 84.
7. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
8. 82 N.J. at 388, 161 A.2d at 83.
9. The speed of transition is indicated by the fact that § 402A of the second
Restatement of Torts was adopted by the American Law Institute three times.
As originally drawn (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961), it was limited to "food for
human consumption." Development progressed so rapidly that a revised
section (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962) was adopted, which included other products
"for intimate bodily use." Two years later the Institute approved the again
revised section (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), applying to "any product."
The only comparable rapid overturn has been the change in the law as
to prenatal injuries, following Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1946). See PRossER, TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964). The products liability change
1966]
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spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire history of
the law of torts. Other courts, in steadily increasing numbers,
fell into line. Six years after the Henningsen decision, the state
of the law in the various jurisdictions may be summarized as
follows: Eighteen of them accept the strict liability, without
negligence and without privity, as to the manufacturers of all
types of products: Arizona,' 0 California," Connecticut,12 the
District of Columbia,'8 Florida, 4 Illinois, 15 Iowa,'8 Kentucky,17
is obviously of much greater social significance.
Articles, notes and comments about all this are legion. In addition to
those cited throughout, the writer has found particularly helpful: Jaeger,
Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DuQuEsN U.L. REv. 1
(1963); Jaeger, How Strict is the Manufacturer's Liability? Recent Develop-
ments, 48 ALRQ. L. Rav. 293 (1965); Jaeger, Product Liability: The Construc-
tive Warranty, 39 NoTRn DA. sm LAW. 501 (1964); Jaeger, Warranties of Mer-
chantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RuMaRS L. REv.
493 (1962); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the
Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAs L. REv. 855 (1963); Lascher, Strict Lia-
bility in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38
So. CA r. L. REv. 30 (1965); Noel, Products Liability of Retailers and Manu-
facturers in Tennessee, 32 TENN. L. REV. 207 (1965); Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363
(1965); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
10. Apparently. There is strict liability without privity for food and drink.
Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957);
cf. Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.2d 162 (1933). In Colvin v. Su-
perior Equip. Co., 96 Ariz. 113, 392 P.2d 778 (1964), involving the direct
sale of a power shovel, the court relied on the Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Ca]. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In Nal-
bandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc., 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P.2d 681 (1965),
the court extended the sales warranty that a pump was fit for use to the
buyer's successor in title. Lockwood, C.J., concurred, insisting that the basis
should be one of strict liability in tort.
11. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.ed 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964) (automobile); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., supra
note 10 (combination power tool).
12. See Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 42, 214 A.2d 691 (Super. Ct.
1965) (automobile); Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409,
192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963) (power golf cart).
13. Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. App. 1962) (automobile); see Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192
A.2d 192 (D.C. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (automobile).
14. Bernstein v. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 177 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965), aff'd, 181 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1966); see Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88
So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (aluminum rocking chair); Smith v. Platt Motors,
Inc., 137 So. 9d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (automobile); Continental Cop-
per & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958) (electric cable).
15. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.ed 182 (1965),
affirming 51 Ill. App. 2d 818, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964) (automobile).
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Michigan,18 Minnesota, 9 Missouri,20 New Jersey 2 ' New York22
North Dakota,"3 Ohio,24 Oregon 2 5 Tennessee,2 and WashingtonY7
16. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa
1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961) (automobile).
17. Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., CCH Product Liab.
Rptr. 5406 (Ky. June 4, 1965) (acetylene tank). For reasons unknown
to the writer, the ease has not been otherwise reported for several months.
18. Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 182 N.W.2d 54
(1965) (welding unit); see Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 184
N.W.2d 780 (1965) (garage door); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 875
Mich. 85, 13 N.W.2d 129 (1965) (shotgun); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders
& Masonry Supply, Inc., 358 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (cinder build-
ing blocks).
19. See Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959) (house
trailer); cf. Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d
557 (1964) (beverage).
20. See Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 872 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963)
(stove).
21. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)
(carpet); see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960) (automobile); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 80
NJ. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (App. Div. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 42 NJ.
177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964) (abrasive disc); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales,
Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (App. Div. 1960) (automobile).
22. See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191
N.E.2d 81 (1963) (airplane); Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 App. Div.
2d 661, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1962) (safety mask); Thomas v. Leary, 15 App.
Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962) (dental chair).
28. Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965) (truck
tractor).
24. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., I Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92
(1965) (steel joists). This was foreshadowed in Rogers v. Toni Home Perma-
nent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 NE.2d 612 (1958), indicating that Wood
v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 278, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1958) might be over-
ruled.
25. See Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624 (Ore. 1965) (pleasure
boat).
26. General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 488, 338 S.W.2d
655 (1960), held the manufacturer of an automobile, but laid stress on the
agency relation of the dealer. This led to decisions denying strict liability in
the absence of such a special agency. Kyker v. General Motors Corp., 214
Tenn. 521, 381 S.W.2d 884 (1964) (pecuniary loss); Oliver Corp. v. Green, 393
S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1965). But in Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d
240 (Tenn. 1966), a case of express representations, the court said by way of
considered dictum that the Dodson case must be taken to state the broader
rule.
27. See Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 401 P.2d 844 (Wash. 1965) (dyna-
mite); Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wash. 2d 720, 393 P.2d 936 (1964)
(glass door); cf. Wise v. Hayes, 58 Wash. 2d 106, 361 P.2d 171 (1961) (in-
secticide).
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Six more have adopted it by statute: Alabama, 8 Arkansas,2 9 Colo-
rado,80 Georgia,$1 Virginia,32 and Wyoming 3 In four others, federal
courts, guessing at state law, have concluded that the rule would
be accepted: Indiana,"4 Kansas,85 Texas,8' and Vermont. 7 Two
28. Ala. Laws 1965, act 549, § 2-318, effective January 1, 1967, amend-
ing the Uniform Commercial Code.
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.1 (Supp. 1965). See also Knowles v. Vick
Chem. Co., 298 S.W.2d 204 (Ark. 1966). The court had previously indicated
a change in the common law in Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 634, S88
S.W.2d 885 (1964) (oxygen tank).
30. CoLo. REv. STAT. AwN. § 155-2-818 (1963), effective July 1, 1966,
amending the Uniform Commercial Code.
31. GA. Coum ANN. §96-307 (1958), discussed in Patterson, Manu-
facturer'a Statutory Warranty: Tort or Contract?, 10 AMRCER L. REv. 272
(1959). The statute was held constitutional in Bookholt v. General Motors
Corp., 215 Ga. S91, 110 S.E.2d 642 (1959). However this statute has been
repealed, Georgia Laws 1962, 109A-10-103, and superseded by GA. CoDE ANN.
§109A-2-318 (1962), which is identical with UNwonm Co ERmcIAIL CODE
§ 2-318.
82. VA. Com ANN-r. § 8.2-818 (1950), discussed in Speidel, The Virginia
".Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804 (1965). The statute was first enacted after
Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equip. Co., 202 Va. 958, 121 S.E.2d
471 (1961), had refused to go beyond food. It now appears as an amendment
to the Uniform Commercial Code.
88. Wyo. STAT. ANN. §84-2-18 (Supp. 1965), amending the Uniform
Commercial Code.
84. See Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965)
(tire); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (fork
lift truck). See also Hart v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp. 817
(N.D. Ind. 1963) (tire); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp.
216 (D. Minn. 1962) (airplane, Indiana law).
85. See B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 Fad 501 (9th Cir. 1959)
(tire). The state court has gone as far as products for intimate bodily use.
See Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 Pa2d 418 (1954).
86. Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (wheel-
chair); Crusan v. Aluminum Co. of America, 250 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Tex.
1965); see Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 822 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963). There
is strict liability as -to food. See Jacob B. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 189 Tex.
609, 164 S.W2d 828 (1942); Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 828 S.W.2d 821
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959). In Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 898 S.W.2d
640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), the court said that this included drugs. Brown
v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), denying the liability as
to an insecticide concentrate, is explained away on the ground that abnorm-
ally sensitive cattle were affected by the product. Seigel v. Braniff Airways,
Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (airplane, Texas law).
37. See Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (water
heater). Vermont has recently accepted strict liability without privity as to
food. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 212 A.2d 69 (Vt. 1965).
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more have intimated, in cases decided on other grounds, that
a change in their law is imminent: Nevada 8 and Wisconsin 9
Pennsylvania has accepted the rule with a limitation as to the
plaintiffs it protects.40 In two states the decisions have not yet
gone beyond products for intimate bodily use: Hawaii4' and
Louisiana.42 In six they have not yet gone beyond food and drink:
Mississippi, 3 Montana," Nebraska,4 5 Oklahoma,4 6 Puerto Rico, 47
and South Carolina."
In ten states there are decisions, not yet overruled, which have
rejected all strict liability without privity of contract: Dele-
38. See Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 899
(1963).
39. Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 114 N.W.2d 828 (1962);
see Barlow v. De Vilbiss Co., 214 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Note, 1963
Wis. L. P~v. 660.
40. Hocbgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1968);
see Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 468 (1964); cf. Duck-
worth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962). But see Thompson
v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961). See text accompanying notes
140-141 infra.
41. Brown v. Chapman, 804 Fad 149 (9th Cir. 1962), affirming 198 F.
Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961) (Hula skirt).
42. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 817 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
There are state cases on food. See Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
70 So. 2d 409 (La. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 878 (1952); cf. Gilbert v. John Gendusa
Bakery, Inc., 144 So. 2d 760 (La. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). The federal court
found the rule broad enough to include cigarettes.
43. See Biedenharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628
(1939); Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1982); cf.
Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 890, 180 So. 479 (1930);
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 805 (1927).
44. By statute, under a pure food act. See Bolitho v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939). In Larson v. United States Rubber
Co., 168 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mont. 1958), the Montana law was held not to
extend to rubber boots.
45. Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252
(1961).
46. Grifin v. Asbury, 196 Okla. 484, 165 P.2d 822 (1945); cf. Southwest
Ice & Dairy Prods. v. Faulkenberry, 208 Oka. 279, 220 Pad 257 (1950).
47. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Torres, 255 Fad 149 (1st Cir. 1958); cf.
Ponce de Leon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 75 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1948).
48. By statute, under a pure food act. See McKenzie v. Peoples Baking
Co., 205 S.C. 149, 31 S.E.ad 154 (1944); cf. Turner v. Wilson, 227 S.C. 95, 86
S.E.2d 867 (1955); Hollis v. Armour & Co., 190 S.C. 170, 2 S.E.2d 681 (1939);
Culbertson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S.C. 352, 154 SM. 421 (1980).
1966]
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ware,49 Idaho,50 Maine," Maryland, 2 Massachusetts,53 New
Hampshire,"4 North Carolina, 5 Rhode Island,56 South Dakota,5 7
and West Virginia. 58 No new state has joined this group since
1935; and except for federal decisions bound by then existing
state law,59 only North Carolina and Rhode Island have reiter-
ated their position since the Henningsen case. To complete the
list, no law has been found in Alaska, New Mexico, or Utah. In
evaluating this last pocket of resistance holding out within the
recesses of the citadel, note must be taken of the fact that most
of these states"0 have now adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code, which provides in section 2-318 that
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natu-
ral person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
49. See Barni v. Kutner, 45 Del. 550, 76 A.2d 801 (1950).
50. See Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Co., 35 Idaho 931, 205
Pac. 1118 (1922).
51. Pelletier v. Dupont, 194 Me. 269, 128 AtI. 186 (1925).
52. Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943); cf. Bryer
v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959); Cloverland Farms
Dairy, Inc. v. Elli, 195- Md. 663, 75 A.2d 116 (1950).
53. See Kennedy v. Brockelman Bros., 334 Mass. 225, 184 N.E.2d 747
(1956); Carlson v. Turner Centre Sys., 263 Mass. 839, 161 N.E. 245 (1928);
Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916).
54. See Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.. 97, 25 A.2d
125 (1942); Hazelton v. First Natl Stores, Inc., 88 N.H. 409, 190 At. 280
(1937); cf. Russell v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 96 NXH. 471, 79 A.2d 573 (1951).
55. Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753
(1964); Wyatt v. North Carolina Equip. Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21
(1960).
56. M lutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R.I. 48, 144 Atl. 884
(1929); Henry v. John W. Esheman & Sons, 209 A.2d 46 (RI. 1965); Lom-
ardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 RI. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955).
57. Whitethom v. Nash-Finch Co., 67 S.D. 465, 293 N.W. 859 (1940).
58. Only a dictum has been found. See Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Mkt.,
121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785, 6 S.E.2d 254 (1939).
59. Schultz v. Tecumseh Prods. Corp., 310 Fa2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962)
(Kentucky law); Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 243 F. Supp. 694 (E.D.
Tenn. 1965) (Tennessee law); Barlow v. De Vilbiss Co., 214 F. Supp. 540
(E). Wis. 1963) (Wisconsin law); see Berry v. American Cyanamid Co.,
341 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965) (Tennessee law); Industrias Velasco, S.A. v.
Applied Power Equip. & Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 937 (S.D. Tex 1964) (Texas
law).
60. Alaska 1962, Maine 1963, Maryland 1963, Masachusetts 1957, New
Hampshire 1959, New Mexico 1961, North Carolina 1965, Rhode Island
1960, South Dakota 1966 (effective January 1, 1967), West Virginia 1963.
U.L.A., U nomo Com racLV.. CoDn 5 (Supp. 1965). But Utah in 1965 struck
out the section.
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guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section.
This at least loosens the shackles of privity to some small ex-
tent. The comment on the section expressly declares it to be
neutral, and not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing
case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer
who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.61
It has been construed not to prevent the expansion;62 and it is
only in PennsylvaniaO3 that it has had any limiting effect.
The reasons offered for this explosion of the present law have
been those carried over from the food cases. The public interest
in human safety requires the maximum possible protection for
the user of the product, and those best able to afford it are the
suppliers of the chattel. By placing their goods upon the market,
the suppliers represent to the public that they are suitable and
safe for use; and by packaging, advertising and otherwise they
do everything they can to induce that belief. The middleman
is no more than a conduit, a mere mechanical device, through
which the thing is to reach the ultimate user. The supplier has
invited and solicited the use; and when it leads to disaster, he
should not be permitted to avoid the responsibility by saying that
he made no contract with the consumer, or that he used all rea-
sonable care. It is already possible to enforce strict liability by
a series of warranty actions, by the consumer against the retailer,
who recovers from the distributor, and so on back to the manu-
facturer; but this is an expensive, time consuming and wasteful
process. What is needed is a shortcut which makes any supplier in
61. Comment 3:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the develop-
ing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
UXT.A., UNWorM Co mrciAL CODE 160 (1962).
62. Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C.
Mlunic. Ct. App. 1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201
N.E.Qd 313 (1964), aff'd, 32 Dl. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); see Delta
Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964); Note, 31 BRooK-
L -L. 11Ev. 367 (1965); Note, 68 Doxc. L. REv. 444 (1964). Contra, Sedgwick,
Conley & Sleight, Products Liability: Implied Warranties, 48 MA.RQ. L. REv.
139 (1964).
63. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1968);
see note 140 infra.
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the chain liable directly to the user. The "risk distributing"
theory-the supplier should be held liable because he is in a posi-
tion to insure against liability and add the cost to the price of his
product-has been an almost universal favorite with the pro-
fessors; but it has received little mention in the cases,"4 and
still appears to play only the part of a makeweight argument6 5
WARRANTY AND STRICT LIABILITY
The concept initially carried over from the food cases to other
products was that of strict liability upon a warranty. This origi-
nated in Mississippi 6 in 1927, in the form of a warranty run-
ning with the goods, by analogy to a covenant running with the
land, as a substitute for an infinite variety of highly ingenious
and equally fictitious theories of third party beneficiary contract,
agencies of the dealer, and the like, by which the courts had
attempted to support the liability without a contract.62' It had
the superficial justification that warranty, a freak hybrid born
of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, had always been
recognized as bearing to some extent the aspects of a tort. In
time the idea of running with the goods was discarded, and the
64. Chief Justice Traynor reiterated it in Seely v. White Motor Co., 403
P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. 1965). See also Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 832 Tm. L. REv. 368
(1965). Judge Wisdom approved it in Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), and it received a line in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), discussed in text
following notes 4-6 supra.
65.
The rationale of risk spreading and compensating the victim has no
special relevancy to cases involving injuries resulting from the use of
defective goods. The reasoning would seem to apply not only in cases
involving personal injuries arising from the sale of defective goods,
but equally to any case where an injury results from the risk creating
conduct of the seller in any stage of the production and distribution
of goods. Thus a manufacturer would be strictly liable even in the
absence of fault for an injury to a person struck by one of the manufac-
turer's trucks being used in transporting his goods to market. It seems
to us that the enterprise liability rationale employed in the Escola case
proves too much and that if adopted would compel us to apply the
principle of strict liability in all future cases where the loss could be
distributed.
Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624, 628 (Ore. 1965) (opinion of
O'Connell, J.).
66. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 805
(1927).
67. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 152-5
(1958).
800
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
warranty was considered to be made directly to the consumer s
Until 1962 warranty had held the field, and no court proceeded
on any other basis, although a good many of them had realized
that this was a new and different kind of "warranty," not aris-
ing out of or dependent upon any contract, but imposed by law,
in tort, as a matter of policy. 9
There were, however, difficulties. "Warranty" had become so
closely identified to the legal profession with a contract between
the plaintiff and the defendant, that it was attended by contract
rules. Traditionally it has always required some reliance by the
plaintiff upon an express or implied assertion; and this was often
lacking on the part of the user. The Sales Act limited warranties
expressly to "buyer" and "seller," and limited their scope. It
required notice of the breach of the warranty within a reasonable
time after the buyer knew, or ought to have known, of the
breach. It also made the warranty subject to disclaimer by the
seller. There were other minor problems, as to the recoverable
damages, a possible election of remedies, and the like.7"
-Whether, given enough time-say another decade-the sales
law of warranties might have worked out a method of dealing
effectively with these problems, or whether, for example, the
Uniform Commercial Code might have been amended generally
as it has been in four states,7' must always be a matter of specu-
lation. 2 But in the desperate hours of the fall of the citadel,
there was no such time.
68. Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So.
2d 878 (1952); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114,
258 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936); see B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Ham-
mond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258
P.2d 317 (1953); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App.
265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
69. See, e.g., Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163,
317 P.2d 1094 (1957); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 ]11. App.
117, 74 NY.E.d 162 (1947); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269
P. 2d 413 (1954); Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d
835 (1942); Jacob B. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
828 (1942); La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d
421 (1957).
70. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124-84
(1960).
71. See notes 28, SO, 32, and 33 supra.
72. See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 17 W. RREs. L. R.Ev. 5 (1965), lamenting that the
solution was not left to the sales law of warranty to work out. Contra, Mc-
Curdy, Warranty Privity in Sales of Goods, 1 HousTon L. REv. 201 (1964),
applauding the jettison of warranty.
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Although the writer was perhaps the first to voice it, 3 the
suggestion was sufficiently obvious that all of the trouble lay with
the one word "warranty," which had been from the outset only a
rather transparent device to accomplish the desired result of
strict liability. No one disputed that the "warranty" was a matter
of strict liability. No one denied that where there was no privity,
liability to the consumer could not sound in contract and must
be a matter of tort. Why not, then, talk of the strict liability in
tort, a thing familiar enough in the law of animals, abnormally
dangerous activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, libel,
misrepresentation, and respondeat superior, and discard the
word "warranty" with all its contract implications? The American
Law Institute approved the proposal, and adopted, in the second
Restatement of Torts, a new section, which states the strict lia-
bility without using "warranty":
§ 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(!2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
A comment7 4 makes it clear that the rule stated is purely one
73. Prosser, supra note 70, at 1134.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) ToRTs § 402A, comment = at 355-56 (1965):
The rule stated in this Section does not require any reliance on the
part of the consumer upon the reputation, skill, or judgment of the
seller who is to be held liable, nor any representation or undertaking
on the part of that seller. The seller is strictly liable although, as is
frequently the case, the consumer does not even know who he is at the
time of consumption. The rule stated in this Section is not governed
by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform
Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected by limita-
tions on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation to
"buyer" and "seller" in those statutes. Nor is the consumer required
to give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time after
it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform Act. The consumer's cause
of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
of strict liability in tort; and that while there is nothing in the
section which would prevent any court from giving it the name
of "warranty," it must be understood that such a warranty is
a very different thing from those usually found in the direct
sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various contract
rules which have grown up to surround such sales.
The first case to consider this approach was a 1962 California
case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.75 Justice Traynor's
opinion is obviously destined to be, along with the Henningsen
case, one of the twin landmarks among these decisions. The
plaintiff was injured when a combination power tool, which could
be used as a saw, a drill, or a wood lathe, proved to be defective
and let fly a piece of wood. He sued the manufacturer, who de-
fended on the ground that notice of the breach of warranty had
not been given to him as required by the Uniform Sales Act.
The California court had long been committed to "warranty" in
the food cases, and had on occasion 8 performed some remark-
able gymnastics to get around the contract rules. It had some-
times even invoked the Sales Act definitions of warranties. Justice
Traynor explained that it had done so, not because the statutes
so required, but because they provided appropriate standards for
the court to adopt under the circumstances presented.77 Here
warranty was not appropriate, and must be discarded; and along
with it the requirement of notice to the defendant. The liability
was simply a strict one in tort.78 The plaintiff made out his case
person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any
disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and his
immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into
the consumer's hands. In short, "warranty" must be given a new and
different meaning if it is used in connection with this Section. It is
much simpler to regard the liability here stated as merely one of
strict liability in tort.
75. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
76. See, e.g., Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. Rd 272, 93 P.2d
799 (1939).
77.
It is true that in many of these situations the court had invoked
the Uniform Sales Act definitions of warranties (CAL. Civ. CoDE:
§ 1782, 1735) in defining the defendant's liability, but it has done so,
not because the statutes so required, but because they provided ap-
propriate standards for the court to adopt under the circumstances
presented.
59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 899-900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
78.
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on
the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manu-
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by proving merely that he was injured while using the tool "in a
way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design
and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the
Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use. 79
The effect of this decision was immediate. Other courts at
once agreed that the proper theory was not one of warranty at
all, but simply of strict liability in tort divorced from any con-
tract rules.80 The number of them is already sufficient to make it
reasonably certain that this is the law of the immediate and the
distant future. There are still courts which have continued to talk
the language of "warranty"; but the forty-year reign of the word
is ending, and it is passing quietly down the drain.
It would be easy, however, to overestimate the significance of
the change, which is more one of theory than of substance. It
is only the rules of contract which have been jettisoned, where
there is no contract. The substance of the seller's undertaking
facturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a con-
tract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed
by agreement but imposed by law . .. and the refusal to permit the
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective
products . . . make clear that the liability is not one governed by the
law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
Accordingly, rules defining the governing warranties that were de-
veloped to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly
be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those injured 'by
its defective products unless those rules also serve the purposes for
which such liability is imposed.
Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
79. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
80. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 839 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Putman v.
Erie City MFg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (Texas law); Lartique v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) (Louisiana law);
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 754 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); of. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 42,
214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), affirming 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964);
see Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d
275 (App. Div. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826
(1964); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (In-
diana law); Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399
(1963); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d
92 (1965); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624 (Ore. 1965); Morrow
v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963). See also Ford Motor
Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instru-
ment Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (1963) ("'strict tort
liability' (surely a more accurate phrase)").
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remains unaffected; and as Chief Justice Traynor himself has
agreed,"' the precedents of the "warranty" cases will still de-
termine what he must deliver. They will determine also the extent
of his liability, except in so far as limitations derived from the law
of contract have been applied. No case has been overthrown unless
it has applied such a contract limitation.
"Until recently courts and commentators have concentrated
on eliminating bars to recovery imposed by the law of sales.
Now they confront the central question: When should the manu-
facturer be responsible to those injured by his products?" 2 With
all the food cases, which are still no less important than those ex-
tending the rule to other products, there are by this time nearly
two hundred cases in which the strict liability has been applied
on one theory or the other. They permit some determination of
a great many questions that have arisen, and some reasonable
speculation as to others not yet settled.
WHAT PRODUCTS?
All types of products are obviously to be included. The liste8
has ranged from automobiles and airplanes to cinder building
blocks, glass doors, and paper cups. There is virtually no indica-
tion 4 of any limitation to things that are extremely or inherently
dangerous in themselves, in spite of all precautions. It is enough
that the product, if defective, will be recognizably dangerous to
the user or to his property. The tide of decisions 8 5 is apparently
81. "Although the rules of warranty frustrate rational compensation
for physical injury, they function well in a commercial setting .... These
rules determine the quality of the product the manufacturer promises and
thereby determine the quality he must deliver." Seely v. White Motor Co.,
403 P.2d 145, 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22 (1965).
82. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 82 TEN. L. Rnv. 368, 365 (1965).
83. Partially set forth in notes 10-37 supra.
84. In Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 401 P.2d 844 (Wash. 1965), stress
was laid on this as to dynamite.
85. Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr.
814 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal.
App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Nichols v. Nold, 174
Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Johnson v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 63 So. 2d 459, 463 (La. Ct. App. 1953); see Jones v. Burgermeister Brew-
ing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
Renninger v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 171 So. 2d 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118 So. 2d 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1960); Addeo v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 39 Misc. 2d 474, 241 N.Y.S.2d
120 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc., 102 NX.2d
281 (Ohio C.P. 1951); Tennebaum v. Pendergast, 89 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio
C.P. 1948).
1966]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:791
sweeping to oblivion the highly metaphysical distinction between
the product and the container in which it is sold, which used
to perplex some courts in the food cases.88 The two are sold as an
integrated whole, and it is inconceivable that anyone would buy
one without the other.sT When a bottle of beer explodes and puts
out the eye of the man about to drink it, surely nothing should
be less material than whether the explosion is due to a flaw in the
glass of the bottle or to overcharged contents.8
There remain, however, two somewhat difficult questions, on
which the final word has not yet been spoken. One concerns
products that are expected to be further processed, or otherwise
altered before they reach the hands of the consumer. If raw pork
is sold to a sausage maker who is expected to cook it properly
before the sausages are sold, it is quite clear that the seller of the
pork should not be liable to a consumer when the pork is not
properly cooked.89 On the other hand, if coffee beans are sold to
a processor who is expected only to roast them and pack them in
vacuum tins, one may surmise that the seller will not escape
liability if the beans are poisoned with arsenic. Likewise the
maker of an automobile with a defective steering gear, or a leak
in the hydraulic brake line, can scarcely expect to be relieved
of his responsibility by reason of the fact that the car is sold
86. Soter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d
575 (1948); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Butler, 180 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944); see Latham v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 175 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1943). See also Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 458, 150
P.2d 486 (1944); McAlester Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lynch, 280 P.2d 466
(Okla. 1955).
The distinction was sometimes made even in cases of direct warranty
on the sale by the retailer to the consumer. Atwell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co., 152 A.2d 196 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959); Crandall v. Stop & Shop,
Inc., 288 Il. App. 543, 6 N.E.2d 685 (1937); Poplar v. Hochschild, Kohn
& Co., 180 Md. 389, 24 A.2d 783 (1942); Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119
S&E.2d 923 (1961).
87. Thus the weight of authority has always supported the recovery in
cases of direct warranty. Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44,
15 A.2d 181 (1940); Mead v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 108
N.E.2d 757 (1952); Poulos v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 322 Mass. 386, 77
NYE2d 405 (1948); Haller v. Rudmann, 249 App. Div. 831, 292 N.Y. Supp.
586 (1937); Geddling v. Marsh, [1920] 1 K.B. 668; see Hadley v. Hillcrest
Dairy, 341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961) (loan of container); Morelli
v. Fitch, [1928] 2 K.B. 636. See also LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50
Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
88. Yet this distinction appears actually to be suggested in McIntyre v.
Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708 (WD. Mo. 1949).
89. Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958).
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to a dealer who is expected to service it, adjust the brakes, mount
the tires, and the like, before it is ready for useY0 On the other
hand, the manufacturer of ordinary pig iron, which is suitable
for a good many uses, is not at all likely to be held to strict
liability when it turns out to be unsafe for the child's tricycle into
which it is finally made by a remote buyer. The question is
essentially one of whether the responsibility for discovery and pre-
vention of the dangerous quality can be shifted to the inter-
mediate party who is to make the changes 1 Since decisions are
lacking on all this, the second Restatement of Torts has taken
refuge in a caveatP2
A broader and a more vital problem concerns the host of
products which, in the present state of human skill and knowl-
edge, are necessarily and unavoidably dangerous to the userf 3
Few, if any products, of course, are absolutely safe. Any knife will
cut, any hammer wielded unskillfully will mash a thumb, any
food can cause indigestion; and no one supposes that the producer
of such things is to be held liable when someone is hurt. But
there are other products which must be recognized by any in-
formed person as involving a much higher degree of danger. Take
whiskey. It is really dreadful stuff. It causes a variety of un-
pleasant consequences, ranging from delirium tremens and cir-
rhosis of the liver to drunken driving; and you really should not
drink as much of it as you do. Is the maker of good whiskey-
as distinguished from whiskey full of fusel oil, strychnine or old
cigar stubs-to be held liable, without negligence and without
privity of contract, for all the harm that may result from its
consumption? In other words, is the maker who has supplied a
popular demand to be held responsible for the drinking habits
of the American public? And is the manufacturer of an automobile
to be held liable for the way people drive it?
90. See Milling, Henningsen. and the Pre-Delivery and Conditioning
Schedule, 16 RuErns L. IREv. 559 (1962); cf. Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 891 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
91. It also becomes involved with questions of "proximate cause," as
to intervening negligence and discovery. See text accompanying notes 186-99
infra.
92. 2 RESTATEMNT (SEcoIND), TORTS § 402A, Caveat (1965): "The In-
stitute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in this Section
may not apply... (2) to the seller of a product expected to be processed or
otherwise substantially changed before it reaches the user or consumer...."
This is discussed in Comment p, from which a part of the text has been
taken.
93. See Keeton, Products Liability -Liability Without Fault and the
Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAs L. REv. 855 (1968).
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Sugar is deadly poison to diabetics; butter, if one may credit
the current medical doctrine, brings on heart attacks by deposit-
ing cholesterol in the arteries; castor oil found use as an instru-
ment of torture under Mussolini. The whole pharmacopoeia is
filled with drugs that are not safe, even when they are properly
made and properly used. 4 A striking example is rabies vaccine,
which frequently causes intense suffering when it is administered,
and occasionally paralysis and death;95 but since the alternative
to its use is probably the most dreadful death known to man, it
is a valued and essential remedy. Is the maker who has done
what can be done to make these things safe to be held liable
when they go wrong? No doubt he must give what warning he
can when the dangers are not likely to be known; no doubt a
product sold without such a warning is to be regarded as defec-
tive96 and will subject him to strict liability; but if he gives such
warning, is he to be held strictly liable for selling the product at
all?97
94. See Rheingold, Products Liability- The Ethical Drug Manufac-
turer's Liability, 18 RuTGEs L. REv. 946 (1964); Spangenberg, Aspects of
Warranties Relating to Defective Prescription Drugs, 37 U. CoLo. L. REv.
194 (1965); Note, 63 CoLum. L. R1v. 515 (1963); Note, 13 ST". L. REv. 645
(1961); Note, 65 YALE. J. 262 (1956).
95. In Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729 (1941),
recovery was denied because the plaintiff was informed of the risk and as-
sumed it.
96. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 559 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (dynamite with inadequate warning). Except as to contributory negli-
gence (see text accompanying notes 249-54 infra), it would appear to make
no difference whether the action is for negligence in not giving the warning,
or on the basis of strict liability for an unsafe product. Of. Gielski v. State,
8 Misc. 2d 578, 155 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (tetanus antitoxin).
97. In Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965), plaintiff used a drug made 'by the defendant under the trade
name of MIER-29, the formula not stated. After using it, the plaintiff suffered
cataracts on his eyes, flaking skin, and loss of hair. The drug, sold to be
taken after a heart attack, had been developed experimentally by the de-
fendant, and found efficacious in the reduction of cholesterol, without evil
consequences to animals. After it was marketed the reports were that it
was causing cataracts, and it was withdrawn from the market. The jury
found, on a special verdict, that in the exercise of ordinary care the defendant
could not have anticipated that the drug would cause cataracts, and that the
state of medical knowledge was then such that the "abreaction" resulting
from unusual susceptibility could not have been expected. Recognizing that
the Texas law of strict liability included drugs, the court held that it did
not apply unless such a result ought reasonably to have been foreseen by a
person of ordinary care in an appreciable number of persons. Judgment
on the verdict for the defendant was affirmed. For a very complete dis-
[Vol. 50:791
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Where negligence is in question, the answer has been simple.
The utility of the product outweighs the risk, assuming that it
is not known, and should not be known, to be unduly great. Does
the strict liability make any change? It is here that the old law
of direct sales warranties enters the picture again. There are a
number of cases that have held that the warranty of merchant-
able quality does not extend to defects and dangers which are
"natural" to the product, and may be expected to be found in it,
such as a fishbone in a fish served in a restaurant,9" or a bit of
turkey bone in roast turkey 9 On the other hand, when the
foreign object is one not usually found in the particular product,
so that the consumer could not reasonably be expected to antici-
pate it, it has been held that it is not "natural" to the product,
and a cause of action for breach of warranty has been found.100
'"Merchantable quality" does not mean a perfect product; it
means only one free from serious and unusual defects. 0 ' And
cussion of other drug cases, involving either negligence or breach of direct
warranty, see Rheingold, oupra note 94.
The same product was involved in Lewis v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400 (Ore.
1966), which held that it was reasonably safe. Also in Bennett v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Il1. 1964), which involved only pleading.
98. Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955);
Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964)
(in fish chowder).
99. Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P.2d 76 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1938); accord, Wieland v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 223 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1955) (chicken bone in chicken fricassee); Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.,
6 Cal. Rd 6743 59 P.2d 144 (1936) (chicken bone in chicken pie); Norris v.
Pig 'N' Whistle Sandwich Shop, 79 Ga. App. 396, 53 S.-2d 718 (1949)
(fragment of bone in meat sandwich); Goodwin v. Country Club, 323 Ill.
App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944) (bone in creamed chicken); Brown v. Nebiker,
229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941) (sliver of bone in pork chops); Courter
v. Dilbert Bros., 19 Misc. 2d 985, 186 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (piece
of prune pit in prune butter); Adams v. Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 251 N.C.
565, 112 S.E2d 92 (1960) (crystallized grain of corn in corn flakes); Allen v.
Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960) (small bit of shell in fried
oysters).
100. Arnaud's Restaurant v. Cotter, 212 F.Qd 883 (5th Cir. 1954) (piece
of crab shell in pompano en papillotte); Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods Mfrs., Inc.,
320 Ill. App. 586, 54 N.E.2d 759 (1944) (bone in noodle soup mix); Lore v.
De Simone Bros., 12 Misc. 2d 174, 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (bone
in sausage); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28
A.2d 913 (1942) (large piece of shell in oysters); Wood v. Waldorf Sys.,
Inc., 79 RI. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951) (chicken bone in chicken soup); Betehia
v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960) (chicken bone
in chicken sandwich).
101. Streff v. Gold Medal Creamery, 96 Cal. App. 18, 273 Pac. 831 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1928) (below average quality); Wilson v. Lawrence, 139 Mass.
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no breach of the warranty is found when the buyer is given what
he asks for and expects to get, even though the whole product is
not free from qualities that cause him loss or damage. 02
There are quite a few cases involving a product such as cement,
useful and reasonably harmless for proper purposes, but capable of
causing serious harm when the user kneels in it and burns his
skin; and in all of them it has been held that there was no lia-
bility, whether for negligence or for breach of warranty. °5 Aller-
gies have filled quite a few pages of the legal literature;10 4 and
318, 1 N.E. 278 (1885) (piano with slightly checked finish). A case which
is something of a sad commentary on the products we buy is Adams v. Peter
Tramontin Motor Sales, Inc., 42 N.J. Super. 813, 126 A.2d 358 (Super. Ct.
1956):
The Pontiac here involved met the test of merchantability. It was
reasonably suitable for ordinary use, and was in fact used to meet
plaintiff's daily needs. It possessed no remarkable defect . . . it was
the average new car which one has come to expect in a mass-produc-
tion year capable of producing over seven million automobiles a year.
It was a car that required the usual "shakedown" period and relatively
minor adjustments to put it in good working order. The motor had to
be adjusted, loose elements tightened, the locks corrected, the dome
light fixed, and a rumbling noise eliminated. All this was done. The
record shows, as noted, that whatever repairs and adjustments had to
be made were admittedly taken care of by defendant willingly and
promptly. Whatever plaintiff's dissatisfaction with her new Pontiac
(she describes it as a "non-vegetative member of the citrus family"-
euphemistic longhand for what the trade blunty calls a "lemon"),
there is nothing in the record which spells out a breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability.
Id. at 325, 126 A.2d at 364.
102. McNeil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 274 Fed. 897 (S.D.N.Y.
1921) (Federal brand of sugar ordered, not merchantable as Eastern cane
sugar); Outhwaite v. A. B. Knowlson Co., 259 Mich. 224, 242 N.W. 895
(1932) ("Elastica" brand of stucco asked for; the whole brand was defective
and inferior, but was held to be "merchantable" under the name).
103. Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d 190, 293 P.2d 26
(1956); Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d
731 (1958); Baker v. Stewart Sand & Material Co., 353 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961); Imperial v. Central Concrete, Inc., 1 App. Div. 2d 671, 146
N.Y.S.2d 307 (1955), aff'd men., 2 N.Y.2d 939, 142 N.E.2d 209 (1957);
Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951).
See also Cavanagh v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 308 Mass. 823, 32 N.E.2d 256
(1941) (rubber stopper of bottle of charged water blew out when temperature
changed and bottle agitated).
104. See Barasch, Allergies and the Law, 10 BRooKYIyN L. REv. 363
(1941); Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and Duty To
Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955); Freedman, Allergy and Products Liability
Today, 24 OHIo ST. L. . 479 (1963); Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as
a Defense to Actions Based Upon Breach of Implied Warranty of Quality,
24 So. CAL. L. REV. 221 (1951); Noel, The Duty To Warn Allergic Users of
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the rule which has emerged is that, if the product is safe for the
normal user, there is no liability when it injures the rare abnormal
one. °5 When the manufacturer knows or should know that there is
danger to a substantial number of persons, even though they con-
stitute only a small percentage of the population, he is under a
duty to give warning;106 but if he gives it, he does not become
liable merely because he has sold the product.
Finally, there are the cases of hepatitis resulting from blood
transfusions, which medical science until very recently knew no
effective way to prevent. Most of them have denied the strict
liability on the rather shaky ground that the transaction is a
service, and not a sale of the blood;10 7 but the cases in which the
defendant was a remote supplier, 0 together with the stress laid
Produc&t, 12 V.N-. L. REv. 331 (1959); Note, 46 Comuaa. L.Q. 465 (1961);
Comment, 49 McH. L. REv.. 253 (1950).
105. Stanton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 Il. App. 496, 8 N.E.2d 801
(194-2); Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., 136 Me. 118, 3 A.2d 650
(1939); Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 340 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109
(1960); Jacquot v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635
(1958); Graham v. Jordan Marsh Co., 319 Mass. 690, 67 N.E.2d 404 (1946);
Longo v. Touraine Stores, 319 Mass. 727, 66 N.E.2d 792 (1946); Barrett v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941); Cleary v. John M.
Maris Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Bennett v. Pilot
Prods. Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951); see Briggs v. National Indus.,
Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Zager v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 324, 86 P.2d 889 (Dist. Ct. App.
1939); Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955). But
see Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513
(1960).
106. Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Hunger-
holt v. Land 0' Lakes Creameries, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 177 (D. Minn. 1962),
aff'd, 319 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1963); Taylor v. Newcomb Baking Co., 317
Mass. 609, 59 N.E.2d 293 (1945); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d
758 (Mo. 1958); see Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., supra note 105;
Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 NE.2d 697 (1939);
Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913); Zirpola v.
Adam Hat Stores, Inc. 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939).
107. Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 270 Minn.
151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y.
100, 123 N.E.Qd 792 (1954); Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints
Hospital, 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile v. Kennewick Public
Hospital Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee
Blood Center, Inc., 28 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
It may be suggested that since the hospital ordinarily bills the blood
as a separate item, it is not at all impossible to make out a price, a transfer,
and a sale. It is no more difficult than in the case of food served by the
hospital kitchen.
108. Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ct. Cl. 1951),
aff'd mer., 280 App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1952); see Balkowitsch v.
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in all of the others upon the unavoidability of the danger, seem
to leave little room for doubt that the real objection to recovery
is the inherently unsafe character of the thing supplied. All this
leads rather irresistibly to the conclusion that there is no strict
liability when the product is fit to be sold and reasonably safe
for use, but it has inherent dangers that no human skill or knowl-
edge has yet been able to eliminate. Some uncertainty is cast
upon this conclusion, however, by the present confused state of
the law as to lung cancer resulting from cigarettes.10 9
There are four cases dealing with this problem;" 0 and in each
there was expert testimony which would permit the jury to find
that the cancer was in fact caused by the product. Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co."' led off in 1961 by finding not
only an express warranty by advertising, but also an implied
warranty that the cigarettes were safe to smoke. This was pointed
up by the concurring opinion of Judge Goodrich, who refused
to go along with the implied warranty, and asked about other
products such as whiskey. The decision was contradicted by
Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,"2 in 1963, and Ross v.
Philip Morris & Co.,: 3 in 1964, both of which held for the de-
fendant on the ground that strict liability did not extend to
dangers which no skill or knowledge thus far existing could avoid.
Then came Green v. American Tobacco Co.,-"4 to throw a flood
of darkness upon the whole problem. The Fifth Circuit began by
sustaining a verdict for the defendant, on the basis of a special
answer of the jury, that at the time of sale the defendant could
not reasonably have known that the cigarettes would cause can-
Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, supra note 107; Koenig v. Milwaukee
Blood Center, Inc., supra note 107.
109. See Rossi, The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plaintiff's Choice of
Theories Explored, 34 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 399 (1961); Comment, 63 CorLum. L.
Rav. 515 (1963); Comment, 42 N.C.L. Rav. 468 (1964).
110. In addition, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776
(5th ACir. 1963), dealt with the statute of limitations, and Fine v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), went off on the Federal
Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 74 Stat. 372 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 1261(1964).
111. 295 F. 2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961). On a second trial the jury found for
the defendant, and this was again reversed, for error in instructing on
assumption of risk, when there was no evidence that the plaintiff was aware
of the risk. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 850 F.2d 479 (8d
Cir. 1965).
112. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
113. 328 Fad 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
114. 804 F2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
812
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cer of the lung. Counsel then persuaded the court that the ap-
plicable Florida law was not clear, and induced it to withdraw the
opinion and take advantage of an unusual procedure which per-
mitted it to put questions to the Supreme Court of Florida. The
question was put--did the Florida law imply a warranty when
the defendant could not have known that the product was dan-
gerous? The sixty-four dollar question was not put, whether there
was a breach of warranty when a product in common use had in-
herent dangers which could not be eliminated. The Florida
courV16 answered that knowledge of the danger was not required
for a warranty; but it was careful to say"0 that it had not been
asked the other question, and did not express any opinion on it.
The Florida law therefore remains uncertain. The Fifth Cir-
cuit,1 7 on the basis of the answer, skipped blithely over the un-
answered question, and left it to the jury."8 The second jury
appears to have put an end to the matter by returning a verdict
for the defendant." 9 There the problem rests.
It is perhaps unfortunate that these cases have arisen in con-
nection with a product about which there has been so much
115. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
116.
We conclude also that the question thus framed does not present
for our consideration the issue of whether the cigarettes which caused a
cancer in this particular instance were as a matter of law unmerchant-
able in Florida under the stated conditions, nor does it request a state-
ment of the scope of warranty implied in the circumstances of this
case.
Id. at 170. In a footnote the court referred to "the problem of individual
reactions to ordinarily harmless substances, discussion of which we deem
unwarranted here because of the lack of Florida precedent and the limited
issue posed in this nonadversary proceeding." Id. at 170 n.2.
Subsequently, in McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965),
it was held that a drug which was unavoidably unsafe was not for that reason
unnerchantable. Accord, Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d
749 (Fla. App. 1966).
117. 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963). In both federal decisions Judge Cam-
eron wanted the issue decided as a matter of law for the plaintiff.
118.
The defendant argues, however, that, even under that [Florida]
definition, it was entitled to a directed verdict because there was no
evidence that Lucky Strike cigarettes were not "reasonably fit and
wholesome." To products intended for human consumption, and the
use of which may cause injury or death, the jury may properly apply
a very strict standard of reasonableness.
Id. at 676.
119. Green v. American Tobacco Co., CCH 1963-65 PRoD. LLr. 5341
(S.D. Fla. 1964).
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popular outcry. One may question whether the Pritchard and
Green cases would have been decided the same way if the product
had been butter, and the ailment a coronary thrombosis on the
part of a fat Milwaukee burgess who had indulged in it for years.
It was undoubtedly to head off such possibilities that the second
Restatement of Torts required that the product be "in a de-
fective condition,"'120 in the sense of having dangerous qualities
not inherent in goods reasonably suitable for sale and use.
WHAT DEFENDANTS?
In all of the cases in which strict liability has been accepted
and applied, the defendant has been engaged in the business
of supplying goods of the particular kind. So far as can be dis-
covered, the question has not even arisen as to whether the rule
might apply to one who is not so engaged.' 12 One may predict
with some assurance that it will not. The housewife who sells a
jar of jam to her neighbor, or the man who trades in a used car
on the purchase of a new one, will obviously stand on a very
different footing so far as the justifiable reliance of third persons
is concerned. It is also very probable that the rule will not apply
to sales outside of the usual course of business, such as execution
sales, or the bulk sale of an entire stock of goods for what they
will bring after bankruptcy or a fire.1
22
The manufacturer who is engaged in such a business is clearly
liable. So is an assembler of parts2  and, except as to airplanes in
New York,2'4 the maker of a component part of the final product
which does not undergo change.2 5 Where the question has been
120. See text accompanying note 74 supra. See Comments g to k under
that section.
121. It should be noted that the implied warranty of merchantable
quality in UxNiomPr SALEs ACT § 15 is limited to one who deals in goods
of that description, and that in UNwonm Coa,%nciAL CoDE § 2-314 it is
limited to a "merchant."
122. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SEco-D), TonTs § 402A and Comment f (1965).
123. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Ford
Motor Co. v. Mathis, 32 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963); King v. Douglas Aircraft
Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
124. In Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 4 3, 191
N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), the maker of an altimeter was relieved
from liability on the unusual ground that the plaintiff had sufficient remedy
against the maker of the airplane. Accord, Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also Halpern v. Jad
Constr. Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 875, 244 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1963), where this
was applied to a tire on a tractor.....
125. McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965); Putman
v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Taylerson v. Ameri-
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considered, most of the courts have applied the same strict lia-
bility without privity to the retail dealer.2 There are, however,
a few courts 2 7 which have carried over their old rule that a re-
tailer does not warrant the goods directly to the consumer, at
least where they are sold in sealed containers, and there are
others which perhaps may do so.'28 Wholesale distributors for the
most part have been held to the strict liability, 29 although here
can Airlines Inc., 183 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Suvada v. White Mo-
tor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). The Taylerson case is no doubt
supplanted by Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra note 124.
126. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d
470 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945); Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409,
192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963); Tiffin v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 20 III App.
2d 421, 156 N.E.2d 249 (1959); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan.
68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953);
Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965); Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Williams
v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 661, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1962);
Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 137 (1962); Parish
v. Great Aft. & Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Munic. Ct.
N.Y. 1958); Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tax. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
127. See Conner v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo.
1939). See also McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp.
708 (WD. Mo. 1949) (manufacturer); De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile
Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336 (1936) (wholesaler). Compare Wil-
liams v. Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948) (manu-
facturer and distributor).
Florida holds the retailer to strict liability without privity as to food
and drugs. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957);
Spencer v. Carl's Markets, Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950), but not as to
other products, Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965);
Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961). See also Smith v.
Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (dealer only
an agent). An exception is made where the plaintiff is a known and intended
user. McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962).
128. Mississippi rejects the warranty on a direct sale by the retailer.
Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933). Also,
without privity, as to the wholesaler. Elmore v. Grenada Grocery Co., 189
Miss. 370, 197 So. 761 (1940).
Tennessee also rejects the direct warranty. Wilkes v. Memphis Grocery
Co., 23 Tenn. App. 550, 134 S.W.2d 929, rehearing denied, 24 Tenn. App.
86, 139 S.W.2d 416 (1940). Also Washington. See Esborg v. Bailey Drug
Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963) (selected by buyer from shelf).
Query, whether the theory of strict liability in tort, if accepted by these
courts, would not change the result?
129. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954);
Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Swengel v. F. & E.
Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938); Challis v. Hartloff,
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again there has been a little disagreement.i80
Surely all of the valid arguments supporting the strict liability
-the public interest in the utmost safety of products, the de-
mand for the maximum protection of the consumer, the implied
assurance in placing the goods on the market for use, the con-
sumer's reliance on the apparent safety of the product, the fact
that the consumer is the seller's ultimate objective, the desir-
ability of avoiding circuity of action and allowing direct recovery
against earlier sellers - all of these apply with no less force against
the dealer. There are enough cases in which the manufacturer is
beyond the jurisdiction,' 81 or the injured plaintiff does not even
know his identity m  to justify requiring the dealer to assume the
responsibility, and argue out with the manufacturer any questions
as to their respective liability. One may suspect that the courts
which relieve the dealer have had in mind the little corner grocery
store. But in these days the dealer is more likely to be Safeway
Stores, or some other nation-wide enterprise which is the prime
mover in marketing the goods, and the manufacturer only a small
concern which feeds it to order.
That this does not exhaust the list of defendants, and the doors
are not yet closed, is indicated by two New Jersey decisions that
have applied the strict liability to the lessor of a self-drive truck 3
136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1983); Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash.
2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940). See Rubins v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App.
2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co.,
63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953).
130. See Elmore v. Grenada Grocery Co., 189 Miss. 370, 197 So. 761
(1940); De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100
S.W.2d 836 (1936); Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d
153 (1952). The last named was a 5-4 decision, one judge having reversed
his position on rehearing. See 32 TEXAS L. RaV. 557, 566-68 (1954); 31
TEXAS L. REv. 594 (1958); 10 WAsH. & LEE L. Rnv. 255 (1953); 1953 WAsH.
UJL.Q. 327.
In Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965), the strict liability of the
wholesaler was denied, on the ground that the case involved loss of the
bargain. See note 168 infra. In Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, 173'S.W.ed 285
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943), the ground for finding no liability was that the food
warranty did not extend to the bottle.
131. E.g., Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 At]. 385
(1932), where the actual packer of corned beef was in Argentina, the first
buyer a subsidiary corporation in Argentina, the primary distributor who
put his name on the can in Illinois, and the retailer, the purchaser, and
the consumer in Connecticut.
132. See, e.g., Comarow v. Levy, 115 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Baum
v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945).
138. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212
A.2d 769 (1965).
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and the builder of a house who sold it. 34 The repair man, who
previously has been held liable without privity for negligence, 35
has not yet appeared as a defendant in a strict liability case.
WHAT PLAINTIFFS?
Any user or consumer of the product, in the broadest sense
of the terms, is protected by the strict liability rule. This includes
not only the final purchaser, but also members of his family,'36
his guests, 37 his employees, 38 his lessee,139 and his donee.140 Penn-
184. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 814 (1965).
135. Hudson v. Moonier, 94 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1938), second appeal, 102
F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1939); Griffith v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 105 Ga. App. 588,
125 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1955) (dictum);
Central & So. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Westfall GMC Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d
841 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Zierer v. Daniels, 40 NJ. Super. 130, 122 A.2d
377 (1956); Kalinowski v. Truck Equip. Co., 287 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y.
Supp. 657 (1933).
136. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939);
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. Rd 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1960); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 318
(1944); Knab v. Alden's Irving Park, Inc., 49 Ill. App. Rd 371, 199 N.E.2d
815 (1964); Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198
N.E.2d 681 (1964); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176
N.W. 882 (1920); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953);
Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938);
Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d
918 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213
N.Y.S.2d 89 (1961); Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d
835 (1942); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 189 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
828 (1942); Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
137. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (Rd Cir. 1963); Thomp-
son v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Tomezuk v. Town of
Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965); Miller v. Louisiana Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 70 So. Rd 409 (La. Ct. App. 1954); Welch v. Schiebel-
huth, 11 Misc. 2d 812, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Conklin v. Hotel
Waldorf Astoria Corp., 5 Misc. Sd 496, 161 N.Y.S2d 205 (N.Y. City Ct.
1957); Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wash. Rd 733, 393 P.2d 936 (1964);
cf. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.Qd 501 (10th Cir. 1959) (coowner
riding in car).
138. Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965);
Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Delta
Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 434, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964); Jones v. Burger-
meister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. Sd 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961); Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. Sd 35,
11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply
Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54 (1965); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leas-
ing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Jakubowski v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (1963), revd on other
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sylvania stands alone 41 in drawing on the Uniform Commercial
Code142 to support a limitation to purchasers, members of their
households, and their guests. The former statute in Georgia was
limited to purchasers.143 Passengers in automobiles"" and air-
planes 45 have been held to be users within the rule, and so has
a customer treated with the product in a beauty shop,1 40 a child
grounds, 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964); Williams v. Union Carbide Corp.,
17 App. Div. 2d 661, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1962); Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div.
2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio
App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965); DiVello v. Gardner -Mach. Co., 46
Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (C.P. 1951); Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co.,
401 P.2d 844 (Wash. 1965).
In Hart v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ind.
1963), and Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575,
5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960), this was accomplished by the device of extending
"privity" to include the employee of a corporation.
139. Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555
(C.P. 1963).
140. Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 Ill. App. 189, 59
N.E.2d 820 (1945); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111
So. 305 (1927); of. Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962), affirming
198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961) (borrower). See also Nemela v. Coca-Cola
Bottling -Co., 104 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937).
141. In Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575
(1963), strict liability was denied as to an employee. This overrules Jarnot
v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). In Yentzer v.
Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964), it was extended to an
employee who had himself made the purchase for his employer. The federal
court in Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53
(El). Pa. 1964), obviously expected a change in the Pennsylvania Law.
142. See text accompanying note 60, supra.
143. GA. Copra § 96-307 (1958), repealed by Georgia Laws 1962, 109A-10-
103, when the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted. GA. CoDE wN .
§ 109A-2-318 (1962). See R. H. Macy & Co. v. Vest, 111 Ga. App. 85, 140
S.E.2d 491 (1965) (donee); Wood v. Hub Motor Co., 110 Ga. App. 101, 137
S.E.2d 674 (1964) (guest in automobile); Revlon, Inc. v. Murdock, 103 Ga.
App. 842, 120 S.E.2d 912 (1961) (employee).
144. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961). See also
McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965) (ship).
145. Public Adm'r v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Con-
lon v. Republic Aviation Corp., 204 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Ewing v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962); Taylerson v.
American Airlines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hinton v. Repub-
lic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); King v. Douglas Air-
craft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d (1963).
146. Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189 (Conn. 1965); Graham v. Botten-
:field's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 Pad 413 (1954).
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injected with vaccine,147 a patient in a hospital supplied with a
paper cup,'14 and a member of the armed forces injured in a Navy
dirigible.149 A wife cooking rabbits for her husband's dinner, with
no intention of eating them herself, has also been included;150 and
even a gasoline filling station attendant making repairs on an
automobile' 5 ' and prospective purchasers trying out the product
before buying it have recovered. 52 It is not necessary that the
plaintiff acquire any interest in the chattel, other than the right
to make a lawful use of it, although it may be conjectured that
an unlawful user, such as the thief of a car, will not be protected.
Bystanders, and other nonusers in the vicinity of 'the expected
use, present a fundamental question of policy. If the philosophy
of the strict liability is that all injured plaintiffs are to be com-
pensated by holding the suppliers of products to strict liability for
all the harm they do in the world, and expecting them to insure
against the liability and pass the cost on to society by adding it
to the price, then there is no reason whatever to distinguish the
pedestrian hit by an automobile with bad brakes from the injured
driver of the car.'5 3 If the supplier is to be held liable because of
his representation of safety in marketing the goods, then the
pedestrian stands on quite a different footing. He is not the man
the supplier has sought to reach, and no implied representation
has been made to him that the product is safe for use; nor has
he relied upon any assurance of safety whatever. He has only
been there when the accident happened; and in this he differs from
no other plaintiff. Thus far, with the emotional drive and the
public concern and demand centering on the consumer, it has
been the second theory that has prevailed; and those who have
no connection with the product except as victims have been
147. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
148. Bernstein v. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 177 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965), aff'd, 181 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1966).
149. Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
150. Haut v. Kleene, 320 Ill. App. 273, 50 N.E.2d 855 (1943).
151. Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963)
(express warranty in advertising).
152. See Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (trying
out fork-lift truck); Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (try-
ing out rocking chair in store). But see Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d
24 (1949), where a shopper in a self-service store was denied recovery because
of the Pennsylvania limitation to purchasers.
153. See Note, 64 CoLUm. L. REv. 916 (1964).
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denied the strict liability,154 and left to negligence.5 5 In 1965,
however, the Michigan court kicked over the traces in Piercefield
v. Remington Arms Co.,"', and found strict liability to a by-
stander injured when a shotgun exploded. One case in a Connecti-
cut superior court, 57 which is disputed by another such court,"
has followed the Michigan decision. It is still too new to permit
any conclusion as to whether it represents a further breakthrough,
or whether it will end only as a more or less isolated departure
from the rest of the law.
WHAT DAMAGES?
Personal injury has been so obvious a consequence of bad food,
and indeed of most other defective products, that it has domi-
nated the field of damages. The cases doing away with privity,
with their shift of emphasis to tort rather than contract, have
apparently snowed under those which formerly denied recovery for
154. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 28 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955) (guest open-
ing glass jar); see Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (pedes-
trian hit by car); Kuschy v. Norris, 25 Conn. Supp. 888, 206 A.Rd 275 (Super.
Ct. 1964) (colliding car); Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (bystander injured by disintegration of sanding kit);
Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 256 Iowa 27, 126 N.W.2d 350 (1964) (driver of
other car in collision); Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d 530,
256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1965) (passengers in colliding car); Kasey v. Suburban
Gas Heat, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374 P.2d 549 (1962) (cafe wrecked by
explosion of propane gas). In Brewer v. Reliable Automotive Co., 49 Cal.
Rptr. 498 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), where a road grader was hit by a truck,
recovery was denied on the wrong ground that property damage was not
recoverable. In Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d
545 (1962), where the plaintiff was hit by a wheel that came off a truck,
the question was left open and the case decided on other grounds. See also,
in a jurisdiction not recognizing strict liability without privity, Alexander
Funeral Home, Inc. v. Pride, 261 N.C. 723, 136 S.E.2d 120 (1964) (plain-
tiff's building run into by a car). RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),ToTs § 4092A,
caveat (1) (1965), expresses no opinion.
155. However, recovery frequently has been allowed on the basis of
negligence. Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959); Carpini v.
Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954); Greyhound
Corp. v. Brown, 269 Ala. 520, 113 So. 2d 916 (1959); Gaidry Motors, Inc.
v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954); Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment
Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y. Supp. 657 (1983); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick
Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
156. 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
157. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct.
1964).
158. Kuschy v. Norris, 25 Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d 275 (Super. Ct.
1964).
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wrongful death resulting from breach of warranty;1 59 and except
as particular statutes may still be construed to prevent it, 160 the
recovery has been allowed. 1l Physical harm to property entered
the picture when the strict liability was first extended to animal
food.162 There seems to be general agreement that the plaintiff can
recover not only for damage to the purchased chattel itself,1 63
as where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its own bad
brakes, but also for damage to his other property, as where a de-
fective stove sets fire to his house. 64
Pecuniary loss, mere pocketbook damage, offers more diffi-
culties. There is nothing inherent in the nature of the harm to
prevent its compensation; and the very first case which threw
overboard the bar of privity allowed recovery to the owner of
159. See Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 801
(8th Cir. 1944); S. H. Kress & Co. v. Lindsey, 262 Fed. 881 (5th Cir.
1919); Whiteley v. Webb's City, Inc., 55 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1951); Goodwin
v. Misticos, 207 Miss. 861, 42 So. 2d 897 (1949); Wadleigh v. Howson, 88
N.H. 365, 189 Atl. 865 (1987).
160. See, e.g., Latimer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 285 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.
1960) (Florida law).
161. Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965)
(Indiana law); Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.
1963); Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 281 F. Supp. 447
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (Texas law); Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp, 204 F. Supp. 856
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Death on the High Seas Act); Ewing v. Lockheed Air-
craft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962) (Indiana law); Hinton v.
Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (California law);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1968); see B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d
501 (10th Cir. 1959) (Missouri and Kansas law); Taylerson v. American
Airlines, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); King v. Douglas Aircraft
Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); cf. Hill v. Harbor Steel &
Supply Corp., 874 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54 (1965).
162. See McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (dog);
Midwest Game Co. v. M. F. A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Sup. Ct.
1959) (fish); Burrus Feed Mflls, Inc. v. Reeder, 291 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965) (cattle).
163. See Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 19- A.2d 122 (D.C. Ct. App.
1963); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa
1289, l1O N.W.2d 449 (1961); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422,
156 A.2d 568 (1959).
164. See Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Sup.
Ct. 1963); Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958)
(defective storage bin). See also the animal food cases cited note 162 supra.
Brewer v. Reliable Automotive Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966),
to the contrary, is pretty clearly overruled by the dictum in Seely v. White
Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
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a restaurant for his loss of business when he served bad food to
his customers. 15 It has been allowed where the product is manu-
factured into something else, so that there is a kind of indirect
physical harm to other property.' 0 It has also been allowed,
either on the basis of a direct warranty to the plaintiff67 or with-
out privity by way of indemnity when he has incurred liability
to someone else. 6s
The difficulty concerns mere loss on the bargain, which is to
say that the product which the plaintiff has received is only worth
less than the price he has paid for it. Here a small majority of
the courts have denied the strict liability;'69 but there are three17
that have permitted the recovery. The denial would appear to be
165. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913). But cf.
Seely v. White Motor Co., supra note 164 (consequential commercial dam-
ages).
166. Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 967 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.
1959) (batch of dough ruined by glass in ice); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain
Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (crop grown from seed); Spence v. Three Rivers
Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958)
(cinder blocks used in a house); of. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (fabrics
made into garments, express warranty). Contra, Atlas Aluminum Corp. v.
Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (Pennsylvania law,
adhesive damaged window panes).
167. Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964);
Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958); Kenower
v. Hotels Statler Co., 124 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1942); Standard Oil Co. v.
Daniel Burkhartsmeier Cooperage Co., 333 Il. App. 338, 77 N.E2d 526 (1948);
W. T. Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 361, 243 N.Y.S.2d 428
(1963); Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660,
136 S.E.2d 56 (1964); Tr City Fur Foods, Inc. v. Ammerman, 7 Wis. 2d
149, 96 N.W.2d 495 (1959); Kennedy-Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner, 5 Wis. 2d
100, 92 N.W.2d 247 (1958).
168. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965);
see 1965 U. IL. L.F. 144.
169. Dennis v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 875 (W.
D. Mo. 1953); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
1965); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 197 N.E.2d 991 (Ohio Ct. App.
1964), aff'd on other grounds, 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965);
see Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon,
398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); cf. Kyker v. General Motors Corp., 214 Tenn.
521, 381 S.W.2d 88s4 (1964).
170. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); Continental
Copper & Steel Indus., Inc., v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d
40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); see Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d
239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Note, 19 RUTGERs L. Rsv. 715 (1965). See
also the cases of express representation cited note 239 infra.
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the sounder rule. Such pecuniary loss is a matter, not only of
what the plaintiff has received, but also of what he has paid for it.
Loss on the bargain must depend upon what the bargain is;
and when the purchaser of a new car trades in his old one to the
dealer, whether he suffers any pecuniary loss, and if so what is
its extent, must necessarily depend upon the allowance made
by the dealer on the trade. It must also be affected by the deal-
er's undertaking to the plaintiff, and whatever representations
or warranties he has made. 1 If the dealer overprices the
goods, or if he sells grade 2 as grade 1, there will be a loss on
the bargain even if they are in no way defective, and of course
all the more if they are; but how much of the loss is to be at-
tributed to the manufacturer? This appears to be clearly, in the
first instance, a matter properly between the purchaser and the
dealer; and if the manufacturer is to be liable, it should be to
the dealer, and for damages which may be quite a different sum
from the dealer's own liability. It is for this reason, undoubtedly,
that the recovery for loss on the bargain has been denied even
where negligence on the part of the manufacturer has been estab-
lished. 172
171. In Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 PF.d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965),
Chief Justice Traynor stated:
We are of the opinion, however, that it was inappropriate to impose
liability on that basis in the Santor case [note 169 supra], for it would
result in imposing liability without regard to what representations
of quality the manufacturer made. It was only because the defendant
in that case marketed the rug as Grade #1 that the court was
justified in holding that the rug was defective. Had the manufacturer
not so described the rug, but sold it "as is," or sold it disclaiming any
guarantee of quality, there would have been no basis for recovery
in that case. Only if someone had been injured because the rug was
unsafe for use would there have been any basis for imposing strict
liability in tort.
Id. at 151, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
172. Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 145 Cal.
App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
cf. Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376
(D. Mass. 1956) (loss of goodwill); Lucette Originals, Inc. v. General Cotton
Converters, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 102, 185 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1959) (same). See
also Donovan Constr. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn.
1955); Polden Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. Zell Elec. Mfg. Co., 1 Misc. 2d 1016,
155 N.Y.S.2d 115, dirmissal upheld on rehearing, 156 N.Y.S.2d 169 (New
York City Ct. 1957); A.J.P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply
Co., 171 Misc. 157, 11 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 258 App. Div.
747, 15 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1939), aff'd mem., 283 N.Y. 692, 28 N.E.2d 412 (1940).
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ABNORMAL USE
There appears to be no reason to doubt that strict liability
has made no change in the rule, well settled in the negligence
cases,'17 that the seller of the product is not to be held liable when
the consumer makes an abnormal use of it. Sometimes this has
been put on the ground that the manufacturer has assumed re-
sponsibility only for normal uses; sometimes it has gone off on
"proximate cause." On either basis, directions and instructions
for use which accompany the product take on a good deal of
importance; and even where a direct warranty from the seller to
his immediate buyer is in question, a violation of such instruc-
tions may make the use an abnormal one for which there is no
liability.' 4 This has been carried over to the cases of strict lia-
bility without privity, as for example where a physician failed
173. See, e.g., Odekirk v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.
1960) (hammers struck together); McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co.,
272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959) (casements for use as window frames by work-
men as ladders); Marker v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th
Cir. 1957) (hot catalyst used in cold catalyst refining unit); Walton v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951) (negligent crop-dusting);
Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (cleaning
fluid mixed with other chemical); Schfranek v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 54
F.2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (wall decorating compound stirred with hand);
Waterman v. Liederman, 16 Cal. App. 2d 483, 60 P.2d 881, appeal denied,
62 P.2d 142 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (wild driving on tire); Stevens v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940) (dangerous method
of controlling powered agricultural implement); Moore v. Jefferson Distilling
& Denaturing Co., 169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930) (match lighted to examine
oil drum); Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1958) (wire
binder for wrapping steel used as handle to lift bundle of steel with crane);
Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 354 Mo. 1147, 193 S.W.2d 581 (1946) (grinding wheel
subjected to side presure); Dubbs v. Zak Bros. Co., 38 Ohio App. 299, 175
N.E. 626 (1931) (wearing shoes that did not fit).
174. Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151 N.E.2d
263 (1958) (glass jar pried open with beer can opener); Taylor v. Jacobson,
336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1958) (hair dye used without patch test);
Wood Motor Car Co. v. Tobin, 120 NJ.L. 587, 1 A.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1938)
(antifreeze used in violation of directions); Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus,
Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 NE.2d 11 (1938) (dry cleaning fluid used in enclosed
space); Landers v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 172 Ore. 116, 139 P.2d 788 (1943)
(bleaching solution not diluted); cf. Boyd v. Frenchee Chem. Corp., 37 F.
Supp. 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (shoe cleaner drunk by child); Bender v. Wil-
liam Cooper & Nephews, Inc., 323 Ill. App. 96, 55 NE.2d 94 (1944) (dis-
infectant not diluted); E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss.
378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954) (soybean meal treated with chemical sold to proces-
sor who disregarded warning and used it in preparing cattle feed).
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to follow the manufacturer's directions in administering a drug,175
or it was sold and used without a prescriptionY.17  Even without
such directions, the use may be clearly an abnormal one, as where
an antiseptic deodorant is used as a mouthwash 77 or a plane is
negligently flown, 78 or aspirin is taken in excessive quantities
over a period of twenty-two years.179 All such departures will de-
feat strict liability.
At the same time the rule is apparently also carried over from
the negligence cases that there are some relatively unusual uses
of a product such as standing on a chair,5 0 eating co:Ree, 181 wear-
ing a cocktail robe in proximity to the flame of a kitchen stove,182
or cooking pork to an inadequate extent which the consumer
believes to be sufficient,"'s which the seller is required to antici-
pate and take precautions against, at least by a proper warning
175. Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr.
322 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
176. Kaspirowitz v. Schering Corp., 70 NJ. Super. 397, 175 A.2d 658
(App. Div. 1961); see Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir.
1946) (express warranty, wire rope subjected to excessive strain); Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (heating unit in-
stalled without recommended valve).
177. Williams v. S. H. Kress & Co., 48 Wash. 2d 88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955).
178. Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964).
179. Cembrook v. Sterling Drug Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 52, 41 Cal. Rptr.
492 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); see Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185
(9th Cir. 1957) (elevator altered by employer); of. Cavanagh v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 308 Mass. 423, 32 N.E.2d 256 (1941) (popping rubber stopper
unable to withstand gas pressure); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267
Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964) (opening bottle in wrong manner);
Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (sensitive cattle in
contact with insecticide); Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 114
N.W.2d 823 (1962) (toy airplane shot by one child at another).
180. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650,
235 P.d 857 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
181. Maddox Coffee Co. v. Collins, 46 Ga. App. 20, 167 S.E. 806 (1932).
182. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.d 848 (1952);
accord, Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (dancing in hula
skirt near a fire).
183. McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 181, 2 NE.2d 513 (1936); Holt v.
Mann, 294 Mass. 21, 200 N.E. 403 (1936); cf. Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline
Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956) (tractor op-
erated downhill at fast speed, using engine compressor as brake); Nathan v.
Electriglas Corp., 37 NJ. Super. 494, 117 A2d 620 (App. Div. 1955) (testing
heat-producing quality of electric fixture); Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259
N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963) (manufacturer of steel truss knew of universal
custom for steel workers to ride the load).
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attached to the product." 4 Thus when an inflammable hair spray
is used, without warning, near a candle, the seller has been held
to strict liability;' and the same is true when dynamite explodes
while it is being handled.8 6 The product is to be regarded as de-
fective if it is not safe for such a use that can be expected to be
made of it, and no warning is given. It is quite probable that
if an otherwise reasonably safe cleaning fluid is drunk by a child,
the seller will be held to strict liability unless it bears a sufficient
warning that it is poisonous.
INTERVENING CONDUCT
There appears likewise to be no doubt that the rule will be
carried over from the negligence cases that the failure of the
dealer, or some other intermediate party, to discover the defect on
the product,s or any other negligent conduct on his part, 88 or
indeed on the part of anyone else,189 which is found reasonably
184. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cr. 1962) (furni-
ture polish drunk by child); Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.
1958) (getting paint into eye).
185. Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198
N.E.2d 681 (1964).
186. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965).
187. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); Alex-
ander v. Nash-Kelvinator Co., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958); Pierce v. Ford
Motor Co., 190 F.92d 910 (4th Cir. 1951); Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 895 (1929);
Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923); Gwyn
v. Lucky City Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123, 113 S.E.2d 802 (1960); Flies v.
Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
188. Burk v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 126 Iowa 780, 102 N.W. 793
(1905) (leaving unlabeled jug of sulphuric acid accessible); Farrell v. G. 0.
Miller Co., 147 Minn. 52, 179 N.W. 566 (1920) (placing unlabeled gasoline
beside kerosene); Moehlenbrock v. Parke, Davis & Co., 141 Minn. 154, 169
N.W. 541 (1918) (surgeons using impure ether); Colvin v. John Powell & Co.,
163 Neb. 112, 77 N.W.2d 900 (1956) (filling barrels containing poison with
molasses).
189. Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (sudden
swerve of driver to avoid collision); Parkinson v. California Co., 2,33 F.d
432 (10th Cir. 1956) (workman lighting match); Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co.,
194 F. Supp. 530 (ED. Pa. 1961) (workman removing guard from meat
grinder); Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (D. Mich. 1918)
(store customer negligently discharged air rifle at plaintiff); Brooks v. Allis-
Chalmerr Mfg. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 410, 329 P.2d 575 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958) (crane operator failed to take precautions against failure of defective
safety device); Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958) (fellow
employee dropped bottle of nail polish remover).
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to be anticipated, will not relieve the earlier supplier of liability.
The manufacturer has been held to strict liability notwithstand-
ing the fact that the dealer should have discovered that the auto-
mobile sold was defective and remedied the defect;"" and the
fact that the driver of the car is negligent in being on the high-
way with defective brakes has been held not to relieve the maker
from indemnity to him when he ran into a bus and settled with
the occupants. 91
On the other hand, where the intermediate party is notified
of the danger, 92 or discovers it for himself, 93 and proceeds de-
berately to ignore it and to pass on the product without a warn-
ing, most of the negligence cases have denied recovery, either
on the basis of "proximate cause," or on the absence of any duty
to protect the consumer against such intentional conduct. In one
case' 94 this has been applied to strict liability. There are, how-
ever, negligence cases in which the product has been so highly
dangerous to the user, and so utterly unfit for its intended use,
that it has been held that the manufacturer is not relieved even
by the dealer's actual knowledge of the danger before resale. 95
This too, no doubt, is likely to be carried over.
At this point there enters the most extreme decision of all
190. Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (ED. Pa. 1962);
Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773
(1960); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
191. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313
(1964), aff'd, 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
192. Nishida v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th
Cir. 1957); Trust Co. v. Lewis Auto Sales, 806 Ill. App. 132, 28 NXE.2d 300
(1940); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.Wad 840 (1946);
Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 841, 246 Pac. 945 (1926); cf. E. I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954).
193. Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 9d 688, 59 P.2d 100 (1936);
Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 Pac. 29 (1916); Olds Motor
Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (1911); see Kapp v. E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 57 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1944); cf. Laughlin v.
Aline Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407
(1962); Drazen v. Otis Elevator Co., 189 A.2d 693 (R.I. 1963).
194. See Halpern v. Jad Constr. Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 675, 202 N.Y.S.2d
945 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
195. See Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal. 2d 310, 282 P.2d
12 (1955) (powerful ammunition for shooting gallery); Farley v. Edward
E. Tower Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930) (inflammable combs for
beauty shop); Clement v. Crosby & Co., 148 Mich. 293, 111 N.W. 745 (1907)
(inflammable stove polish); of. Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler,
208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925) (explosive mixture of gasoline and kero-
sene).
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those applying the strict liability to date, Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co.,191 in California in 1964. In that case it was held that
the obligation of the manufacturer to supply the ultimate pur-
chaser with an automobile safe for his use was such that it could
not be delegated to the dealer, and that it could not escape lia-
bility for an unsafe product on the ground that the defect in the
brakes might have been caused by something the dealer "did
or failed to do" in servicing the car before final delivery. 97 It
might perhaps be possible to explain the case on the basis of the
rather peculiar relation between automobile makers and their
authorized dealers;' but it has been followed below in the case 90
involving a concrete cutting machine, where everything in the
way of an agency was specifically rejected. The limits of the
Vandermark decision, if it is to be accepted, are not yet clear.
It appears to apply only to the delegation of "servicing," or other
work completing the product; and it can scarcely be supposed
that the manufacturer would be liable, where, for example, a
bottle of beer is cracked by the dealer while it is being handled.
But even as to such servicing, whether the decision would be the
same if the dealer discovered the danger and sold the car delib-
erately with no attempt to remedy it, is not yet determined. It
at least eliminates any intervening negligence, whether of act
or of omission, in preparing the product for final sale. 00
196. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
197.
These rules focus responsibility for defects, whether negligently
or nonnegligently caused, on the manufacturer of the completed
product, and they apply regardless of what part of the manufacturing
process the manufacturer chooses to delegate to third parties. It ap-
pears in the present case -that Ford delegates the final steps in that
process to its authorized dealers. It does not deliver cars to its dealers
that are ready to be driven away by the ultimate purchasers but relies
on its dealers to make the final inspections, corrections, and adjust-
ments necessary to make the cars ready for use. Since Ford, as the
manufacturer of the completed product, cannot delegate its duty to
have its cars delivered to the ultimate purchaser free from dangerous
defects, it cannot escape liability on the ground that the defect in
Vandermark's car may have been caused by something one of its
authorized dealers did or failed to do.
Id. at 261, 391 P.2d at 170-71, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 898-99.
198. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d
655 (1960), where the dealer was held to 'be the manufacturer's agent to pass
on an express warranty and, by inference, also an implied one.
199. Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514
(1964).
200. As to what this may include, see Milling, Henningsern and the Pre-
Delivery Inspection and Conditioning Schedule, 16 RUrLERs L. REV. 559
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NOTICE TO THE SELLER
The Uniform Sales Act 01 requires notice to the seller of any
breach of warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer
knows, or ought to know, of the breach; and the requirement has
been retained by the Uniform Commercial Code. °2 Commer-
cially this is a sound rule designed to protect the seller against
unduly delayed claims; 2°3 and as between those engaged in com-
mercial dealings the notice may be expected to be given as a
matter of course. The requirement is still quite commonly pre-
served as to a direct warranty from the last seller to his pur-
chaser.204 But as applied to personal injuries to a consumer, and
notice to a remote seller, it has proved to be something of a booby
trap for the unwary. The injured consumer is seldom "steeped
in the 'business practice' which justifies the rule,"2 5 and at least
until he has legal advice it will not occur to him to give notice
to one with whom he has had no dealings. This has given the
strict liability courts a good deal of trouble.
Some courts have assumed, without discussion, that the stat-
utory provision as to notice applies to warranties without priv-
ity. °6 Actually, however, there appears to be no such case in
which the seller haq succeeded in avoiding the strict liability on
the ground of lack of timely notice. The first palliative resorted to,
to get around the Sales Act section, was to hold that where there is
personal injury, and the plaintiff has had no dealings with the
defendant, long delay in giving notice is excused, or at least
the jury may find that it is excused, and the notice is given
within a "reasonable time" under the circumstances. 07 A federal
(1962). See also Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The
Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 30 (1965).
201. U ionm SALEs AcT § 49.
202. UNiFoxi Coin~amcwA Conn § 2-607 (3).
203. See American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corp., 7 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925) (opinion of L. Hand, J.).
204. Owen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 273 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1959); Smith
v. Pizitz, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 122 So. 2d 591 (1960); De Lucia v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 193 Conn. 65, 89 A.2d 749 (1952); Nekuda v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 175 Neb. 396, 121 N.W.2d 819 (1963); Ringstad v. I. Magnin &
Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952); Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash.
2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945); Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis.
2d 224, 122 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
205. James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. Rnv. 44, 192, 197 (1955).
206. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1961); Bonker v. Ingersoll Prods. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955)
(Pennsylvania law).
207. Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1961), affirming Chap-
man v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
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court2 °0 applying California law even held that notice given after
the suit had begun came within a reasonable time. The com-
plete overthrow of notice began in 1957, when the Washington
court,209 in a food case, held that the Sales Act provision applied
only as between "buyer" and "seller" and had no application
where there was a noncontractual "warranty" and the parties
were not in privity. This has now been followed by several other
cases 2 10 Justice Traynor, in the Greenman case,"' made use of
the strict tort liability to get rid of notice, simply on the ground
that no "warranty" was involved at all. This too already has
found support.'
In the Vandermcark case213 the California court developed this
further by holding that even on a direct sale from a retail dealer
to his immediate buyer the notice was not required, since even
this was a noncontractual matter of strict liability in tort, and
there was no warranty in the case. This has been followed as
yet only by an intermediate California court. 14
The conclusion would appear to be evident that the manu-
facturer can place no reliance at all upon the defense that he
has not been given notice, either because it is held not to be
Tobaco Co., supra note 206; Bonker v. Ingersoll Prods. Co., supra note 206;
Maecherlein v. Scaly Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331
(1956). See also, as to direct warranties, Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d
826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948) (two dissenting opinions); Ringstad v. I. Magnin &
Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952); Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash.
2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945).
208. Hampton v. Gebhardt's Chili Powder Co., 294 Fad 172 (9th Cir.
1961).
209. Lallue v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 814 P.2d 421
(1957).
210. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (Ver.-
mont law); Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.
Ill. 1964); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961) (dictum),
af'd on other grounds, Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962);
Ruderman v. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn. Supp. 416, 184
A.2d 63 (1962); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d
129 (1965); Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen, 61 Wash. 2d 720, 893 P.2d 936
(1964).
211. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (strict liability an alternative ground).
212. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 805
(1965); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624 (Ore. 1965).
213. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
214. Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr.
754 (1963).
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required from one with whom he has not dealt, or because long
delay in giving it will be found to be excused. Even as to the
direct sale from the retail dealer to the plaintiff, the Vandermark
case casts quite a shadow of doubt upon the defense, and the
frequency with which delayed notice has been excused goes far
to destroy all confidence in it in any case.
DISCLAIVERS
The Uniform Sales Act 18 permits the seller to disclaim any
warranty, and the Uniform Commercial Code2 16 has continued the
rule, although in a much more restricted form. Commercially a
disclaimer may not be at all an unreasonable thing, particularly
where the seller is not sure of the quality of what he is selling
and unwilling to assume the responsibility for it, and the buyer is
willing to take his chances. Many goods are quite reasonably sold
"as is." Even in such transactions, the power thus placed in the
hands of the seller can be a dangerous one; and the courts have
struggled to obviate injustice by finding that the disclaimer was
not brought home to the buyer, 17 or by construing it away as
inapplicable to the facts. 18 It is quite another thing, however,
215. U uont SALEs AcT § 71.
216. UFonR CoEAraclAL CODn § 2-316.
217. Not effective when made after contract made: Edgar v. Joseph
Breck & Sons Corp., 172 Mass. 581, 52 N.E. 1083 (1899); Ward v. Valker,
44 N.D. 598, 176 N.W. 129 (1920); see Amzi Godden Seed Co. v. Smith,
185 Ala. 296, 64 So. 100 (1913).
Fine print: Woodworth v. Rice Bros. Co., 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y. Supp.
722 (Sup. Ct.), af'd without opinion, 193 App. Div. 971, 184 N.Y. Supp. 958
(1920); of. Federal Motor Truck Sales v. Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, 250 N.W.
718 (1933).
Obscure place: Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951);
Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155 S.E. 268 (1930).
218. Not applicable to "breach of contract" or "failure of considera-
tion": Rocky Mountain Seed Co. v. Knorr, 92 Colo. 320, 20 P.2d 304 (1933);
Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951); International Har-
vester Co. v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S.W. 549 (1914); Lewitus v. bnde-
pendent Fruit Auction Corp., 128 Misc. 384, 219 N.Y. Supp. 5 (App. Div.
1926); Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 135 S.E. 141 (1926); Smith v.
Oscar H. Will & Co., 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 861 (1924).
Only applicable to express warranties: W. F. Main & Co. v. Dearing &
Wallace, 73 Ark. 470, 84 S.W. 640 (1905); Hardy v. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928); Hughes v. National
Equip. Corp., 216 Iowa 1000, 250 N.W. 154 (1933); Lutz v. Hill-Diesel
Engine Co., 255 Mich. 98, 237 N.W. 546 (1931); McPeak v. Boker, 236 Minn.
420, 53 N.W.2d 130 (1952); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W.
790 (1927); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Wirtz Bros., 15 N.D. 477, 107 N.W. 1078
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to say that the user of a product is bound by a disclaimer which
he has never seen; and it is another thing also to say that the
consumer who buys at retail is bound by a manufacturer's dis-
claimer which is handed to him with the product, and to which
he has done nothing whatever to accede other than to receive it.
In such a case all reality of assent is lacking;219 and if sellers,
in disregard of their sales appeal, are to be permitted to escape
liability by adding to the label on the package such words as
"Not Warranted in Any Way," the developing law could ob-
viously be frustrated. It might have been predicted that this
would not be tolerated. It had already been held220 that the manu-
facturer could not disclaim liability for his negligence; and there
was a New York trial court decision 221 rejecting a disclaimer on
a direct sale of food as opposed to "natural justice and good
morals."
With the elimination of privity, the tort character of the war-
ranty provided the way out. If the statutes did not apply because
there was no privity, and the warranty was not a matter of con-
tract, a contract disclaimer should have no effect. The Henningsen
(1906); Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, 161 S.C. 40, 159 S.E. 461 (1931).
Not applicable to property damage: Diamond Shale Co. v. Godwin, 100
Ga. App. 799, 112 S.E.2d 865 (1959).
Does not exclude obligation to deliver a merchantable article according to
the description: W. F. lain & Co. v. El Dorado Dry Goods Co., 83 Ark.
15, 102 S.W. 681 (1907); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268
P.2d 1041 (1954); Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St.
328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922); United Fig & Date Co. v. Falkenburg, 176 Wash.
122, 28 P.2d 287 (1934); see Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 Mia-. L. REV. 117, 157-67 (1943); Note, 77 HAav. L. REV. 318
(1963); cf. Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Mfg. Co., 169 N.C. 41, 85 S.E. 35
(1915); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 492, 156 A.2d 568 (1959)
(limitation to replacement of parts not applicable where truck was wrecked).
219. See Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53
CoLTum. L. REV. 1072, 1089 (1953); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. R.v. 629 (1948).
2,20. See Ebers v. General Chem. Co., 810 Mich. 261, 274-75, 17 NXE.2d
176, 181 (1945); Champlin v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 918
(1959); cf. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Frey, 127 La. 183, 53 So. 486
(1910).
221. Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 880, 9
N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (New York City Munic. Ct. 1959). Compare, construing
the disclaimer as not intended to apply to personal injuries: Kennedy v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y. Supp. 121 (1923); accord,
Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1948);
cf. Wright-Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307, 312, 133 N.E.2d 713,
715 (1956).
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case222 refused to uphold the standard automobile warranty, in
itself a disclaimer of nearly all liability, as a defense to the manu-
facturer. This has been followed by several other courts, 23 al-
though Florida2 24 is apparently holding out to the contrary. The
theory of strict liability in tort, which discards the "warranty"
entirely, has of course done nothing to aid the disclaimer.
225 It
has still persisted, in most of the decisions, as a possible defense
to the retail dealer on a direct sale to the plaintiff;220 but the
Vandermark case,227 as well as a decision in N1-ichigan," have
struck it down as contrary to the policy of the law even as to
such defendants where the product is dangerous to human safety.
The conclusion is evident that, so far as strict liability of the
manufacturer is concerned, no reliance whatever can be placed
upon any disclaimer; that even as to dealers it is beginning to
222. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). Actually this was not the first such decision. In Jolly v. C. E. Black-
well & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 624, 211 Pac. 748, 750 (1922), it had been held
that "since a specific warranty as to personal property cannot run with the
thing itself, we see no reason why a disclaimer of warranty should run with
the thing." Cf. Sokoloski v. Splann, 311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E.2d 874 (1942).
In Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959),
an automobile manufacturer's disclaimer was rejected without discussion.
223. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 101 (D. Hawaii 1961), af'd,
304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.
2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Browne
v. Fenestra, Inc., 875 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965); Lang v. General
Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); General 'otors Corp. v. Dod-
son, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
224. Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So. 2d 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
accord, Amercan Can Co. v. Horlamus Corp., 341 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1965).
225. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964), rejected the disclaimer on this basis.
226. See Alaska Pac. Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.ad 643
(2d Cir. 1947); American Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. McKoy-Helgerson Co., 226
F. Supp. 842 (W.D.S.C. 1963); Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp.
70 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Harmon v. Coonrod, 148 Kan 146, 79 P.2d 831 (1938);
Kolodzcak v. Peerless Motor Co., 255 Mich. 47, 237 N.W. 41 (1931);
Knecht v. Universal Motor Co., 113 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1962); McInnis
& Co. v. Western Tractor & Equip. Co., 63 Wash. 2d 652, 388 P.2d 562
(1964); Norway v. Root, 58 Wash. 2d 96, 361 P2d 162 (1961); Payne v.
Valley Motor Sales, Inc., 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622 (1962).
227. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
Apparently the disclaimer may still be effective as to pecuniary loss. See
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
228. Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965).
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be rejected; and that in any case there are too many loopholes
available for the defense to be at all reliable.
EXPRESS REPRESENTATIONS
All of the foregoing has concerned "implied warranty" to the
consumer, or the strict liability in tort which is replacing it. But
the seller's strict liability may be enlarged by his express repre-
sentations. In 1932, in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,2 the Washing-
ton court imposed strict liability upon the manufacturer, with-
out privity, upon the basis of statements in its distributed litera-
ture, which the consumer read and upon which he testified that
he relied, that the glass in the windshield of an automobile was
"shatterproof." The theory first adopted was that of an express
warranty to the plaintiff; but on a second appeal20 the court
shifted its ground to one of strict liability, in the nature of de-
ceit, for innocent misrepresentation. This last has been by no
means unknown in cases of direct transactions of sale,asl but
this was its first appearance without privity of contract. The
other courts, in general, have followed the first opinion and talked
express warranty, but this year the Tennessee court,23 8 not
wishing to overturn a decision denying strict liability on an im-
plied warranty as to pecuniary loss," 4 reverted to the theory of
misrepresentation. This seems clearly to be the preferable justi-
229. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, affd on rehearing, 168 Wash. 465, 15 P.d
1118 (1932).
230.
[S]ince it was the duty of appellant to know that the representations
made to purchasers were true. Otherwise, it should not have made
them. If a person states as true material facts susceptible of knowl-
edge to one who relies and acts thereon to his injury, if the representa-
tions are false, it is immaterial that he did not know they were
false, or that 'he believed them to be true.... The court charged the
jury that "there is no proof of fraud in this case." It has become
almost axiomatic that false representations inducing a sale or con-
tract constitute fraud in law.
179 Wash. 123, 128, 35 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1934).
231. See PnossER, TORTs § 102, at 724-28 (3d ed. 1964).
232. Even in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. Rd 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), where the "implied warranty" was dis-
carded in favor of strict liability in tort, the court continued to talk of
express warranty as to representations made in literature.
233. Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240, 251 (Tenn. 1966); cf.
Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cr. 1956).
234. Kyker v. General Motors Corp., 214 Tenn. 521, 381 S.WRd 884
(1964).
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fication, since "warranty" has been no more of a blessing where
there is express language than there is not.
The Baxter case has been generally followed.28 5 The seller has
been held to strict liability to the user for statements that prove
to be false, when they are made to the public in labels on the
goods themselves,ms or in advertising,2 7 or in disseminated litera-
ture,-2 38 and it can be found that the plaintiff relied upon such
285. Two early decisions rejecting the Baxter case, Rachlin v. Libby-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 Fad 597 (2d Cir. 1938), and Chanin v. Chevrolet
Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937), are now out of line with state law.
236. Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302
P.2d 831 (1956) (mattress; plaintiff stabbed in her "gluteal prominence");
Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 Pad 723 (1955)
(boned chicken); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953)
(watermelon seed); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mg. Co., 241 Mo. App.
1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (washing powder); Simpson v. American Oil
Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940) (insecticide); Wise v. Hayes, 58
Wash. 2d 106, 361 P.2d 171 (1961) (insecticide); see Bonker v. Ingersoll
Prods. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955) (boneless chicken fricassee,
Pennsylvania law); Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54
NW.2d 769 (1952) (liniment). See also Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197
P.2d 854 (1948) (detergent).
This had been held even before the Baxter case. Graham v. John R.
Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W.2d 859 (1931) (seed); Conestoga Cigar
Co. v. Finke, 144 Pa. St. 159, 22 Atl. 868 (1891) (tobacco tag).
287. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1961) (cigarettes); Arfons v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d
434 (2d Cir. 1958) (dynamite, Ohio law); Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress
Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956) (mattress); Lane v. C. A.
Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P2d 723 (1955) (boned chicken);
Hamon v. Digiliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 Aad 294 (1961) (detergent); Con-
nolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963) (automobile);
Spiegel v. Saks 34th Street, 43 Mise. 2d 1065, 252 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct.
1964) (cosmetic); Inglls v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209
N.E2d 583 (1965) (automobile); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,
167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) (permanent wave solution); Marko-
vich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181
(1958) (same); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966)
(automobile). See also Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D.
Iowa 1958) (corn storage bin); Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co., 67
F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946) (scrap metal).
238. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.
1960) (tire, brochure); Arfons v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d
434 (2d Cr. 1958) (dynamite, literature, Ohio law); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)
(power tool, brochure); Bahbman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683,
288 N.W. 309 (1939) (automobile, literature); Brown v. Globe Labs., Inc.,
165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957) (sheep vaccine, circular); Baxter v.
Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), second
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statements in his use of the product. Since the basis of the lia-
bility does not turn on the character of the goods, but upon the
representation, it was from the beginning not confined to food, and
has ranged over a wide variety of other products, from cosmetics
and detergents to automobiles, scrap metal, wire rope, and a
mattress. The representation may obviously undertake respon-
sibility for more than the safety of the product, and all damages
are recoverable to which it fairly extends. Where the question
has arisen, nearly all of the courts have held that the seller's
liability extends to pecuniary loss, including loss of the bargain." 9
The limitations upon the rule appear to be fairly certain. It
seems clear that there must be a representation of fact, and more
than mere "puffing" or sales talk.240 On the other hand, broad
appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934) (automobile, literature); see
Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (wire rope, manual).
See also Ein v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 173 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ind.
1959) (tire, method not specified). In Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962)
(fabrics), there were labels on the goods, advertising, and distributed litera-
ture.
This is all the more clear when the dealer is supplied with an express
guarantee to be passed on to the consumer. Timberland v. Climax Mfg.
Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932) (locomotive, "guarantee"); Studebaker Corp.
v. Nail, 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E.2d 198 (1950) ("service policy" on automo-
bile); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959) ("insurance
policy" on house trailer); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App.
438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960) (automobile warranty).
239. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal.
1965); Posey v. Ford Motor Co., 128 So. 2d 149 (Fla. App. 1961); Beck v.
Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959); Inglis v. American Motors
Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965); of. Hoskins v. Jackson
Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (inferior crop grown from seed); Randy
Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399,
226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (garments made from fabrics shrank). But see
Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960) (ex-
cessive consumption of gasoline and oil by automobile). In Holz v. Coates
Motor Co., 147 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1966), the plaintiff failed only for lack
of proof of the damages.
240. See Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952); Topeka Mill &
Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964 (1950); Brown v. Globe
Labs., Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Ralston Purina Mills v.
Iiams, 143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d 452 (1943); Maupin v. Nutrena Mills,
385 P.2d 504 (Okla. 1963). See also the deceit cases cited in PROSSER, TonTs
§ 104, at 738 (3d ed. 1964).
Thus in Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625
(1922), "pure and nutritious" was held not to warrant that there was no
nail in a loaf of bread. In Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash. 2d
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general assertions of quality, and particularly those of safety,
as for example that a power tool is "rugged, ' 241 a detergent is
"kind to the hands,"2 or that cigarettes are "harmless" and
"safe to smoke,' 243 may be found by the jury to include a repre-
sentation that there is nothing to make the product unsafe. The
representation must be made by the defendant, or chargeable
to him, and a dealer, merely by passing it on, does not adopt the
manufacturer's representation.244 It must be made with the in-
tention, or at least the expectation, that it will reach the plain-
tiff,2- 5 or a class of persons which includes him; and when there
is no such intention or expectation the general rule246 that liability
for misrepresentation does not extend to unexpected third par-
ties applies to bar the recovery. 47 Finally, the plaintiff must
180, 100 P.2d 30 (1940), a picture of an automobile being turned over at
sixty miles an hour, and one of a freight car resting on top of it, were held
to convey nothing that was actually false. Cf. Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d
434 (Ea. 1952); Bertram v. Reed Auto. Co., 49 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932).
241. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
242. Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253
S.W.2d 582 (1952).
243. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1961); of. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 296 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.
1960) (tires "safe" within stated limits); Arfons v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958) (dynamite "safe" for the purpose); Hamon
v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961) (detergent "safe for house-
hold tasks"); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963)
(automobile advertising, adding up to statement that it was "safe for its
intended use"); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244,
147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) (permanent wave solution "safe and harmless").
244. Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
245. Cf. Lindroth v. Wagreen Co., 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595
(vaporizer); Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wash. 2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952) (trac-
tor). In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Cavanaugh, 217 Cal. App. 2d
492, 32 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1963), representations made to a contractor were
held to inure to the owner of the building on which he worked.
246. See Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Parties, 19 VAND. L. REV.
231 (1966).
247. Hermanson v. Hermanson, 19 Conn. Supp. 479, 117 A.2d 840 (1954);
Barni v. Kutner, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 550, 76 A.2d 801 (1950); Berger v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907); Pearl v. William Filene's
Sons Co., 317 Mass. 529, 58 N.E.2d 825 (1945); Turner v. Edison Storage
Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928); Silverman v. Samuel Mal-
linger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.9d 715 (1958); Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell Co.,
122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1922). See also Senter v B. F. Goodrich Co.,
127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954).
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rely upon the representation,24 not necessarily in making his pur-
chase, 49 but at least in using the product.
CONTRIBUTORY FAULT
Superficially the warranty cases, whether on direct sale to the
user or without privity, are in a state of complete contradiction
and confusion as to the defense of contributory negligence. It
has been said in a good many of them that such negligence is
always a defense to an action for breach of warranty. It has been
said in almost as many that it is never a defense. This is no more
than a part of the general murk that has surrounded "warranty,"
and is one more indication that this unfelicitous word is a source
of trouble in the field. Actually, however, the disagreement is
solely a matter of language; and if the cases are examined as to
their substance, they fall into a very consistent pattern.
Where the negligence of the plaintiff consists only in failure
to discover the danger in the product, or to take precautions
against its possible existence, it has uniformly been held that it
is not a bar to an action for breach of warranty. 50 Thus if he
248. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941); Randall v.
Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W.2d 769 (1952). See also Senter v.
B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954); Dobbin v. Pacific Coast
Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P2d 642 (1946).
249. In Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963), the
plaintiff was not a purchaser at all, but a filling station attendant doing
work on an automobile.
In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir.
1965), an omitted period in the Pennsylvania version of the Sales Act was
held (the writer would say erroneously) to eliminate the requirement of
reliance on the warranty. One judge dissented.
250. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 850 Fa.d 479 (3d Cir.
1965) (smoking cigarettes in ignorance of danger of lung cancer); Brown
v. Chapman, 804 F2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962), affirmng 198 F. Supp. 78
(D. Hawaii 1961) (dancing in hula skirt near a fire); Crane v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 82 Cal. Rptr. 754 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(use of surface preparer in ignorance of danger of combustion from distant
flame); Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (handling milk bottle without knowledge of defect);
Simmons v. Witchita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 85, 309 Pad 633
(1957) (failure to discover matches in beverage); BahIman v. Hudson Motor
Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 809 (1939) (express warranty of top of
car, negligent driving); Brockett v. Harrell Bros., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d
897 (1965) (failure to discover shot in ham); see Challis v. Hartoff, 136
Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933) (poisoned flour; details not alleged, but quite
unlikely that plaintiff discovered it). See also Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.,
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eats a wormy candy bar,251 or drives negligently on a defective
tire, 152 without being aware of the defect, his recovery is not
barred, even though he ought to have discovered it. This is en-
tirely consistent with the rule applied to other strict liability in-
volving animals, or abnormally dangerous activities.253 But if
he discovers the defect, or knows the danger arising from it, and
proceeds nevertheless deliberately to encounter it by making use
of the product, his conduct is the kind of contributory negligence
which overlaps assumption of risk; and on either theory his re-
covery is barred?5 4 This too is consistent with the law as to other
191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A2xd 568 (1959) (failure to discover defect in king-
pin of truck). But see Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 281 Mass. 65, 120
N.E. 407 (1918) (failure to discover pebble in beans).
251. Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
252. Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965);
Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 Fad 254 (6th Cir. 1960).
258. See PnossEa, TORTS § 78, at 588-40 (3d ed. 1964).
254. Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 318 F.2d 348 (1oth Cir. 1962)
(smoking in bed); Hitchcock v. Hunt, 28 Conn. 343 (1859) (using barrels
known to be leaking); Tomita v. Johnson, 49 Idaho 643, 290 Pac. 395 (1930)
(planting seeds known to be the wrong kind); Cedar Rapids & I.C. Ry.
& Light Co. v. Sprague Elec. Co., 203 In. App. 424, aff'd, 280 Ill.
386, 117 N.E. 461 (1917) (use of electric shovel after discovery of defect);
Frier v. Proctor [sic] & Gamble Distrihb. Co., 173 Kan. 733, 252 P.2d 850
(1953) (use of detergent with knowledge it was injuring hands); Topeka
Mll & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964 (1950) (feeding
chickens with knowledge feed was injuring them); Barefield v. La Salle Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 870 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963) (drinking beverage
known to be full of broken glass); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267
Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964) (opening bottle in wrong manner);
Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Min. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955) (continued use of
oil burner known not to be functioning properly); Missouri Bag Co. v.
Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952) (use of bags known
to be defective); Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 2S5 Mo. App. 679, 147
S.W.2d 124 (1941) (refrigerated meat showcase used after discovery of un-
fitness); Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965)
(opening glass toothbursh container with pressure); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (driving truck know-
ing brakes to be bad); Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros. 281 N.Y. 474, 24 N.E.2d
131 (1939) (improper cooking of pork by experienced cook); Bates v. Fish
Bros. Wagon Co., 50 App. Div. 38, 63 N.Y. Supp. 649 (1900) (use of heating
apparatus after discovery of defect); Bruce v. Fiss, Doerr & Carroll Horse
Co., 47 App. Div. 273, 62 N.Y. Supp. 96 (1900) (use of horse discovered to be
dangerous); Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E.2d 668
(1941) (eating biscuits with foul odor); Pauls Valley Milling Co. v. Gabbert,
182 Okla. 500, 78 P.2d 685 (1938) (planting seeds known to be the wrong
kind); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Nicholson, 17 Pa. Super. 188
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strict liability255 There has been as yet no case involving the
strict liability in tort which discards warranty, but it appears
quite certain that the same rules will apply.
It is always possible that the plaintiff's negligence may consist
of an abnormal use of the product, and whether there is discovery
of the danger or not, the recovery may be barred on that
ground.25 6
PROOF
Strict liability eliminates both privity and negligence; but it
still does not prove the plaintiff's case. He still has the burden
of establishing that the particular defendant has sold a product
which he should not have sold, and that it has caused his in-
jury. 57 This means that he must prove, first of all, not only that
he has been injured, but that he has been injured by the product.
The mere possibility that this may have occurred is not enough,
and there must be evidence from which the jury may reasonably
conclude that it is more probable than not. Thus it is not enough
to show that the plaintiff became ill after eating the defendant's
tinned salmon, where there is no proof of what else he ate, and
others who ate the salmon were not made ill25
The plaintiff must prove also that he was injured because the
product was defective, or otherwise unsafe for his use. The fact
that a plane has crashed does not establish that it was defective,
(1901) (use of rope after it had broken); Tex-Tube, Inc., v. Rockwall Corp.,
379 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (failure to shut off pump after dis-
covery of leak in pipes).
255. See PROSSER, TORTS § 78, at 539-40 (3d ed. 1964).
256. A good case on this is Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940
(2d Cir. 1964), where defendant withdrew the defense of contributory negli-
gence because it could not prove which decedent was flying the plane. It
was held, nevertheless, that the plaintiff must sustain his burden of show-
ing that the crash was due to a defect in the plane rather than to negligent
flying. See also Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir.
1963) (smoking in bed); Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70
(ND. Iowa 1958) (plaintiff's storage of high-moisture content corn in a
bin held to be the proximate cause of damage to the corn).
257. Particularly helpful on this are Keeton, Products Liability- Proof
of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. Rsv. 675 (1963); Keeton,
Products Liability -Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J.
26 (1965).
258. Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16 Wash. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 740
(1942); accord, Landers v. Safeway Stores, 172 Ore. 116, 139 P.2d 788 (1948)
(bleaching compound).
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until the possibility of negligent flying has been eliminated 5
An oxygen tank is not shown to be defective merely because an
explosion has occurred in a regulator which the plaintiff has at-
tached to it;260 and an unusual method of opening a bottle may
prevent any conclusion that there was anything wrong with it.
26
'
And the bare fact that the plaintiff became ill after exposure to
the defendant's insecticide does not prove that it was unreason-
ably dangerous to human beings.6 2 On both of these issues, how-
ever, expert opinion may be sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's
case 
3
Further, the plaintiff must prove that the defect was in the
product when it was sold by the particular defendant. 64 When
259. Hurley v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1966).
260. Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964).
261. See Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d
557 (1964).
262. Scientific Supply Co. v. Zelinger, 139 Colo. 568, 341 P.2d 897 (1959);
ef. Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955)
(proof of foreign matter in beverage not enough without proof that it was
dangerous to human beings).
263. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963)
(lung cancer from cigarettes); Kuzma v. United States Rubber Co., 323 F.2d
657 (3rd Cir. 1968) (disintegration of grinding wheel); Pritchard v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (lung cancer from cigar-
ettes); Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963)
(failure of automobile).
As to negligence, compare Tracy v. Finn Equip. Co., 310 F.2d 436 (3d
Cir. 1962) (precautions that might have been taken to prevent fan starting
up); Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961) (design of
automobile trunk); Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404
(3d Cir. 1954) (bus with petcock of air chambers too close to ground);
Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930) (wrong material in
steering wheel of tractor); Varas v. Barco, Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246,
22 Cal. Rptr. 737 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (threads on cap of gasoline tank);
Alward v. Paola, 79 Cal. App. 2d 1, 179 P.2d 5 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947)
(design of master cylinder of brake system).
264. United States Rubber Co. v. Bauer, 319 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1963)
(breaking of belt drive might be due to other causes); Sharpe v. Danville
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Il. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442 (1956) (inter-
mediate handling of bottle after it left manufacturer); Williams v. Paducah
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164 (1951) (same);
Sundet v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 139 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. 1966)
(same as to cartridges); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42
NJ. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964) (assembly line unit might have worn out);
Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 NJ. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962) (studs
on wheel might have worn out); Krupar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 160 Ohio
St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954) (intermediate handling as to needle in soap);
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on the evidence it is equally likely that it developed after the
product left his hands, as where food has been opened and ex-
posed for a considerable time by the dealer,265 no liability is
established on the part of any previous seller.
When the plaintiff has proved this much, all trial lawyers know
that he usually recovers in a negligence action against the manu-
facturer. There have been occasional cases in which the defect
has been such that res ipsa loquitur has not been applied to aid
the plaintiff in his proof of negligence,.." and there have been a
few in which the defendant's evidence of his own due care has
been held to be so conclusive as to entitle him to a directed ver-
dict,267 and fewer still in which the jury has found that there
is no negligence. 65 These cases are obviously to be changed. But
by and large, when the proof reaches this point, the jury is per-
mitted to, and does, find for the plaintiff. The alarm of the manu-
facturers over the prospect of a great increase in liability under
the new rule is not in reality justified. 60 As to the dealer, against
whom there is frequently no proof of negligence at all, it will
certainly result in some occasional increase.
The difficult questions, as to the last two stages of proof, are
those of circumstantial evidence and inferences from the facts.
There is no indication that these are to be dealt with in any
different manner from the negligence cases. Res ipsa loquitur,
strictly speaking, is not an applicable principle when there is no
question of inferring any negligence; but the inferences from cir-
cumstantial evidence which are the core of the doctrine are no
less applicable to the strict liability.270
Tennebaum v. Pendergast, 89 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio C.P. 1948) (intermediate
handling of bottle after it left manufacturer).
265. Tiffin v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 181 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.W.2d 406
(1959); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 884, 155 So. 217 (1934).
266. H. J. Heinz Co. v. Duke, 196 Ark. 180, 116 S.W.2d 1089 (1938);
Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N.E. 258 (1896) (contaminated
oysters); O'Brien v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 255 Mass. 558, 152 N.E. 57
(1926); Crocker v. Baltimore Dairy Lunch Co., 214 Mass. 177, 100 N.E.
1078 (1918).
267. Nichols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1929);
Swenson v. Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289, 236 N.W. 310 (1981); Smith
v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942).
268. See, e.g., Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 93
N.W.2d 467, mandate amended on denial of rehearing, 94 N.W.2d 645 (1959).
269. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1114-19 (1960).
270. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa
1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961). In Wood v. Hub Motor Co., 110 Ga. App.
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The bare fact that an accident happens to a product, that
an automobile goes into the ditch,a21 is usually not sufficient proof
that it was in any way defective. Even the fact that it is found
afterward to be in a condition that could have been the cause is
not enough, if it is no less likely that the condition was brought
about by the accident itsef.27 On the other hand, the addition
of very little more in the way of other facts, as for example that
a new car veered suddenly and sharply from the road without
the fault of the driver,2 7 3 that the defect had given trouble be-
fore the accident,274 that other similar products made by the de-
101, 137 S.E.2d 674 (1964), it was said merely that res ipsa loquitur had no
application under the Georgia statute.
271. Payne v. Valley Motors Sales, Inc., 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 SXE.2d
622 (1962) (wheel broke); of. Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 365 Mo.
625, 285 S.W.2d 585 (1955) (fact that combine did not give satisfactory
service does not prove a defect). As to negligence, compare McNamara v.
American Motors Corp., 247 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1957) (backing car shot
forward); Smith v. General Motors Corp., 227 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1955)
(car leaving road, testimony as to possibility of defect); Jastrzembski v.
General Motors Corp., 100 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (car starting into
motion); O'Hara v. General Motors Corp., 85 F. Supp. 319 (El). Mich.
1940) (car lenving road); Herrin's Adm'x v. Jackson, 265 S.W.2d 775 (Ky.
1954) (door of car coming open); Glinski v. Szylling, 858 Mich. 182, 99
N.Wad 687 (1959) (prior vibration in steering wheel not enough); Kramer
v. R. M. Hollingshead Corp., 5 N.J. 386, 75 A.2d 861 (1950) (motor ex-
ploded while plaintiff pouring in solvent); Ayers v. Amatucci, 206 Okla.
866, 243 P.2d 716 (1952) (leakage of gasoline); Kimmey v. General Motors
Corp., 262 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (fire while plaintiff was
filling gasoline tank); Price v. Ashby's Inc., 11 Utah 2d 54, 354 P.2d 1064
(1960) (ear left the road); Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., 196 Wash. 213, 82
P.2d 556 (1938) (leakage of gasoline).
272. Negligence: Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 212 F.2d 805 (6th
Cir. 1954) (steering wheel of tractor off shaft); Hupp Motor Car Corp. v.
Wadsworth, 113 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1940) (tire deflated; opinion of ex-
pert rejected); Davis v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 196 F. Supp. 407 (N.D.
Cal. 1961) (tread separated from tire); Fisher v. Sheppard, 366 Pa. 347, 77
A.2d 417 (1951) (broken sleeve in differential); Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385,
172 N.W. 736 (1919) (tire blown out).
273. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). Accord, Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d
198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) ("pronounced abrasion or scuff
mark at the lower part of the bottle"); LeBlanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346
Mass. 225, 191 N.E.2d 301 (1963) (car went into gear with shift lever in
neutral); M. Dietz & Sons, Inc. v. Miller, 43 N:J. Super. 334, 128 A.2d
719 (1957) (brake failure after car driven only fifty miles).
274. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa
1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961) (localized smell of burning before fire in new
car; also expert testimony); Clark v. Zurich Truck Lines, 344 S.W.2d 304
(Mo. App. 1961) (plaintiff lost control of car before it left the road; also
expert testimony).
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fendant had met with similar misfortunes,2 75 or the elimination of
other causes,176 or the aid of expert opinion,2 77 may be enough
to support the inference. In addition, there are some accidents,
as where a beverage bottle explodes 27s or even breaks279 while
it is being handled normally, as to which there is human ex-
perience that they do not ordinarily occur without a defect. As
in the cases of res ipsa loquitur, the experience will give rise to
the inference and it may be sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's
burden of proof.
Tracing the defect in the product into the hands of the de-
fendant confronts the plaintiff with greater difficulties. There is
first of all the question of lapse of time and long continued use.
This in itself is not enough, even when it has extended over a
good many years, to defeat the recovery where there is satis-
factory proof of an original defect;"' but when there is no definite
evidence, and it is only a matter of inference from the fact that
something broke or gave way, the continued use usually prevents
275. Negligence: Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282
S.W. 778 (1926); Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 S.C. 383, 126
S.E.2d 178 (1962); cf. Ashkenazi v. Nehi Bottling Co., 217 N.C. 552, 8
S.E.2d 818 (1940).
276. Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501, 370 P.2d 116
(1962) (chemical burns after beauty shop treatment; expert testimony elimi-
nating the possibility of plaintiffs allergy).
277. Kuzma v. United States Rubber Co., 323 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1968)
(disintegration of grinding wheel); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.
2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (automobile wrecked); Simp-
son v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. App. 1968) (brake failure);
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289,
1o N.W.2d 449 (1961) (fire in automobile). See also cases cited note 263
supra.
278. See cases cited note 85 supra.
279. Vassallo v. Sabette Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr.
814 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (milk bottle, immediately after delivery).
280. Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1958) (oil
well drilling outfit collapsed after fifteen years of use; expert testimony that
a proper weld would have had the same life as the derrick); International
Derrick & Equip. Co. v. Croix, 241 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1957) (defective
weld on oil well derrick gave way after seven years); Fredericks v. Ameri-
can Export Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1955) (break in stevedore's
skid after 2 years use); Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st
Cir. 1934) (coffee urn tipped over after seven years of use); Hartleib v. General
Motors Corp., 10 F.R.D. 380 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (flywheel of truck disinte-
grated after two or three years); Darling v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal.
App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959) (inspection cover on deck plate of bulldozer
broke off after three years); Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp., 26 N.J.
Super. 295, 97 A.2d 699 (1953) (stool collapsed after three years).
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the inference that the thing was more probably than not defec-
tive when it was sold. 81 It has been said a good many times that
the seller does not undertake to provide a product that will not
wear out.8 2 There are other cases in which long use has been
given weight, along with other evidence, in the conclusion that
no original defect was shown. s In a few cases a distinction has
been made as to stationary parts, which are not so likely to fail
with wear, and an original defect has been found. 8 4
Once past the hurdle of use, the plaintiff must eliminate his
own improper conduct as an equally probable cause of his in-
jury.281 When he has done this, and has accounted for any inter-
mediate handling, he has of course made out a sufficient case
of strict liability for the defect against the dealer who has last
sold the product. The very presence of the latter in the picture,
however, means that he must be eliminated before the manu-
facturer can be held. When on the evidence it appears equally
likely that the defect has developed in the hands of the dealer,
the plaintiff has not made out his case against anyone else.288
281. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199
A.2d 826 (1964); Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d
545 (1962); accord, as to negligence, United States Rubber Co. v. Bauer, 319
F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1963); Solomon v. White Motor Co., 153 F. Supp. 917
(W.D. Pa. 1957); Sterchi Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Castleberry, 28 Ala. App. 281,
182 So. 471 (1938); Kapp. v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 234 Ark. 395,
353 S.W.2d 5 (1962); Gorman v. Murphy Diesel Co., 3 Terry (Del.) 149,
29 A.2d 145 (1942); Hofstedt v. International Harvester Co., 256 Minn.
45, 98 N.W.2d 808 (1959); Auld v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 App. Div. 918,
25 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1941), af'd mem., 288 N.Y. 515, 41 N.E.2d 927, 35
N.Y.S.2d case 2 (1942); Gomez v. E. W. Bliss Co., 27 Misc. 2d 649, 211
N.Y.S.2d 246 (1961); Ayers v. Amatucci, 206 Okla. 366, 243 P.2d 716 (1952).
282. See, e.g., Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177,
199 A.2d 826 (1964); Gomez v. E. W. Bliss Co., 27 Misc. 2d 649, 211 N.Y.S.2d
246 (1961); Auld v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 App. Div. 918, 25 N.Y.S.2d
491 (1941), aff'd mem., 288 N.Y. 515, 4.1 N.E.2d 927, 35 N.Y.S.2d case 1
(1942).
283. Purkey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 220 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1955);
Simmons v. Gibbs Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ohio 1959), af'd
mem., 275 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1960); Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,
'17 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Okla. 1936); Ulwelling v. Crown Coach Corp., 206
Cal. App. 2d 96, 23 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
284. See Carney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962)
(stepladder); Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405
(1951) (carbon particles deposited by refrigerator); Parker v. Ford Motor
Co., 296 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1956) (axle housing of truck) (by implication).
285. See PaossER, ToaRs § 39, at 228-29 (3d ed. 1964).
286. Tiffin v. Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 181 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d
406 (1959) (opened meat); Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9
I1. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442 (1956) (bottle); Williams v Paducah Coca-
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This has meant, in a good many cases, that when a beverage bottle
explodes or breaks the case against the manufacturer is not estab-
lished until the handling by intermediate parties has been ac-
counted for.=s7 There need not be conclusive proof, and only
enough is required to permit a finding as to the greater proba-
bility25 8 Since the plaintiff nearly always finds it difficult to
obt~in evidence as to what has happened to the bottle along the
way, the courts have been quite lenient in finding the evidence
sufficient. He is not required to do the impossible by account-
ing for every moment of the bottle's existence since it left the
bottling plant;289 and it is enough that he produces sufficient
evidence of careful handling in general, and of the absence of
unusual incidents, to permit reasonable men to draw the con-
clusion.P1
If the product reaches the consumer in a sealed container,
with the defect on the inside, the inference against the manu-
facturer is much more easily drawn. The foreign object in the
Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164 (1951) (same); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934) (opened meat);
Sundet v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 139 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. 1966)
(cartridges, several handlers); Tennebaum v. Pendergast, 89 N.E.2d 490
(Ohio C.P. 1948) (bottle).
287. As to negligence, compare Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d
217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958); Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reisinger, 68
So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1953); Joflre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. 1,
158 A.2d 631 (1960); Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 Minn. 471,
51 N.W.2d 573 (1952); Smith v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 97 N.H. 522, 92
A.2d 658 (1952); Keffer v. Logan Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 141 W. Va.
839, 93 S-E .d 225 (1956); accord, Huggins v. John Morrell & Co., 176 Ohio
St. 171, 198 N.E2.d 448 (1964) (explosion of pickled pig's feet, several inter-
mediate handlers); Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 160 Ohio St. 489, 117
N.E.2d 7 (1954) (needle in cake of soap).
288. Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949);
of. Honea v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944);
Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 93 N.W.2d 467, mandate
amended on denial of rehearing, 94 N.W.2d 645 (1959).
289. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 101 Ga. App. 166, 112
S.E.2d 811 (1960), aff'd, 216 Ga. 61, 114 S.E.2d 517 (1960); Zarling v. La
Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 2 Wis. 2d 596, 87 N.W.2d 263 (1958).
290. Ryan v. Adam Scheidt Brewing Co., 197 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1952);
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949); Groves
v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1949); Lanza v.
De Ridder Coca Cola Bottling Co., 3 So. 2d 217 (La. Ct. App. 1941);
Ferrell v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 320 S.W.2d 5292 (Mo. Ct. App.
1959); Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Crow, 200 Tenn. 161, 291 S.W.2d
589 (1956); cf. Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d
87 (1949).
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bottled beverage is the typical case. 91 There have been decisions
that have held that the plaintiff must still disprove tampering
with the bottle, 92 particularly where there is evidence that it
has been exposed to the mercies of irresponsible persons,293 or
a charged beverage is found to be "flat" when it is opened. 94
But in the absence of any such special reason to look for it, the
considerable majority of the later cases have held that intentional
tampering is so unusual, and so unlikely, that the plaintiff is not
required to eliminate the possibility.29 5
There have been sporadic attempts to aid the plaintiff's diffi-
culties of proof in cases where multiple defendants were joined.
As to both negligence and warranty, the Kansas court 96 has
shifted the burden of proof as to tracing the defect to the
shoulders of the dealers and the manufacturer; and Pennsylvania
has done the same as to negligence. 97 The reasoning in these cases
as to the meaning of "exclusive control" is not very convincing;
and they are quite evidently deliberate decisions of policy, seek-
291. Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N..2d
193 (1953); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919,
60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So. 2d
409 (La. Ct. App. 1954); Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich.
235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961); Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955); Keller v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214
Ore. 654, 330 P.2d 346 (1958).
2992. Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, 258 S.W.2d 475 (Ky.
1953); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d
721 (1942); Jordan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 117 Utah 578, 218 P.2d 660
(1950).
298. Williams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98
N.E.2d 164 (1951); Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1955).
294. Sharpe v. Danvill Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132
N.E.2d 442 (1956).
295. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st
Cir. 1958); Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla.
1958); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So.
2d 873 (1952); Keller v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 Ore. 654, 330 P.2d
346 (1958); see Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43,
978, P.2d 575 (1955); of. Le Blanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346 Mass. 225, 191
N.E.2d 301 (1963) (automobile). Partlcularly where the beverage foams or
effervesces when it is opened. Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 I1.
App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953); Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 Atl. 700 (1929); Wichita Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Tyler, 288 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
996. Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953).
297. Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
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ing to compensate the plaintiff and to require the defendants to
fight out the question of responsibility among themselves. The
same is to be said of a federal case out of Texas29 where the bur-
den was shifted to the maker of dynamite and the maker of the
cap attached to it, on the ground that they were cooperating
to make a combination product, and one from New York299
where the same thing was done as to the maker of an altimeter
and the manufacturer of a plane in which it was installed. Also
of obvious importance in this connection is the Vandermark
decision °00 in California, holding that the manufacturer cannot
delegate to the dealer the responsibility for the final "servicing"
of the product.
Except perhaps in this last respect, it seems quite apparent
that there is nothing in any of the strict liability cases to indicate
that the problems of proof will be dealt with in any different
manner than in those involving only negligence.
298. Dement v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960).
299. Becker v. American Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 889 (SD.N.Y. 1961).
300. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 891 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). See text accompanying notes 196-200 supra.
